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Continuinga study of thefirst hundredyears of constitutionallitigation, Professor Currieexplores the decisions of the Taneyperiodrespecting the Contract and Commerce Clauses. Though early decisions
ofthe Taney Courtseemed to portenda departurefromthe nationalism
of itspredecessor, the author argues that the impression was largely

misleading. In general,for example, the Court under Taney proved
rathersympathetic to contractrights. In Commerce Clausecases, after

beingbadly split, the Court was able to agree on a longlastingformula
that acknowledged an implicit limitation on statepower, and although

in the Taneyperiodthe Courtnever clearly struck down a state law on
Commerce Clausegrounds, itfoundother ways to protectthe interest in
unobstructedcommerce.

The fourth installment of a critical examination of early Supreme

Court constitutional decisions,' this article begins to deal with the
nearly thirty-year period during which Roger B. Taney was Chief Jus-

tice. Taney's appointment in 1836 marked a watershed in the member* Harry N. Wyatt Professor of Law, University of Chicago. My thanks to the Duke
University School of Law, where this paper was delivered as the Brainerd Currie Memorial
Lecture; to my colleagues Frank Easterbrook, Dennis Hutchinson, and Rayman Solomon for their
helpful criticism; and to Mark Holmes and Roy Underhill for valuable research assistance.
1. See Currie,The Constitution in the Supreme Court, 1789-1801, 48 U. CHI. L. REv. 819
(1981) [hereinafter cited as Currie, Supreme Court, 1789-1801]; Currie, The Constitution in the
Supreme Court: The Powers of the Federal Courts, 1801-1835, 49 U. CHI. L. REv. 646 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as Currie, FederalCourts, 1801-18351; Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme
Court: State and CongressionalPowers, 1801-1835, 49 U. CHI. L. REv. 887 (1982) [hereinafter
cited as Currie, States and Congress,1801-1835].
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ship of the Court. 2 President Jackson had appointed three new Justices
in the seven years before Taney: John McLean, Henry Baldwin, and

James M. Wayne. Within a year, Jackson and President Van Buren
were to appoint three more: Philip P. Barbour, John Catron, and John
McKinley.3 Of the Justices who sat with Marshall before 1829, only
Joseph Story and Smith Thompson remained. Thus, from nearly the

beginning of his tenure, Taney presided over an almost entirely new
Court, one with seven members appointed by Jackson and Van Buren.
It was an opportunity for a fresh start.
Taney's term stretched from the age of Jackson until almost the
end of the Civil War. Twenty Justices sat during these twenty-eight

years. Four of Taney's original brethren

-

Barbour, Baldwin, Thomp-

son, and Story - left the Court between 1841 and 1845. During the
next fifteen years, as in the middle days of Marshall, 4 the Court en-

joyed a notable stability in membership. Seven Justices sat together
2.
JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT DURING THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP OF ROGER B. TANEY

1835
Joseph Story
Smith Thompson
John McLean
Henry Baldwin
James M. Wayne
Roger B. Taney
Philip P. Barbour
John Catron
John McKinley
Peter V. Daniel
Samuel Nelson
Levi Woodbury
Robert C. Grier
Benjamin R.
Curtis
John A. Campbell
Nathan Clifford
Noah H. Swayne
Samuel F. Miller
David Davis
Stephen J. Field

(1811-1845)
(1823-1843)
(1829-1861)
(1830-1844)
(1835-1867)
(1836-1864)
(1836-1841)
(1837-1865)
(1837-1852)
(1841-1860)
(1845-1872)
(1845-1851)
(1846-1870)
(1851-1857)
(1853-1861)
(1858-1881)
(1862-1881)
(1862-1890)
(1862-1877)
(1863-1897)

1840

1845

1850

1855

1860

1865

-

I
I
I

I-

-

(Adapted from G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW app. A, at A-2,
A-3 (10th ed. 1980)).
3. Congress created two new seats on the Court by the Act of Mar. 3, 1837, ch. 34, § 1, 5
Star. 176, 176 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1 (1976)). A number of new states had been without
circuit justices and thus without circuit courts before this expansion. See 5 C. SWISHER, HISTORY
OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 58 (1974).
4. See Currie, FederalCourts, 1801-1835, supra note 1, at 647.
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from 1846 to 1860: Taney, McLean, Wayne, Catron, Peter V. Daniel,
Samuel Nelson, and Robert C. Grier. McKinley, Levi Woodbury,
Benjamin R. Curtis, and John A. Campbell effectively completed the
roster during this period. The remaining five Justices-Nathan Clifford, Noah H. Swayne, Samuel F. Miller, David Davis, and Stephen J.
Field-appeared only briefly at the end of Taney's Chief Justiceship, as
forerunners of the next change in Court membership. Taney's tenure
ended as it began, with a whole generation of Justices ending their careers at nearly the same time.
Accomplishments sometimes end before careers, however, and the
Supreme Court had been in a somewhat suspended state before Taney
appeared on the scene. The bulk of Marshall's architectural workfederal judicial power to protect federal rights, congressional authority
to regulate navigation and establish a bank, and significant limitations
on state legislative power-had been completed by about 1825. 5 New
Justices like McLean, Baldwin, and Thompson broke more frequently
with the Marshall consensus, taking a less restrictive view of limitations
on state authority. As the absences of Justices Gabriel Duvall and William Johnson increased, three major constitutional cases were deferred
due to inability to muster a majority of the full Court. In 1835 and
1836 three vacancies occurred,6 and the Court decided no important
constitutional cases.
The new day dawned with a bang in 1837, when the three big
cases so long postponed were finally decided: New York v. Miln,7 Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky," and Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge.9
Each concerned limitations on state power, in each the Court upheld
state authority; in each Story wrote an impassioned dissent lamenting
the dismantling of all that Marshall had built. Despite a flock of Republican appointments, Jefferson and Madison had failed to dislodge
the Federalist philosophy from its last citadel in the courts; Jackson
and Van Buren now had apparently succeeded.
Overall, however, the 1837 decisions proved to have created a false
impression. In certain respects the Court continued to be somewhat
more solicitous of state authority under Taney than it had been under
Marshall. Yet Taney and his brethren not only wielded the contract
clause with considerable vigor to protect vested rights against state im5. See generally Currie, FederalCourts, 1801-1835, supra note 1; Currie, States and Congress, 1801-1835, supra note 1.

6. See generally G. GUNTHER, supra note 2, app. A, at A-2, A-3.
7. 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837).
8. 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 257 (1837).
9. 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837).
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pairment, but also (with one notorious exception) forcefully extended
the limits of federal legislative and judicial power. None of this was
accomplished with the unanimity that had characterized the best days
of Marshall; repeated dissents by true states'-righters like Campbell
and Daniel highlighted just how far from that category Taney and most
of his colleagues were. At the same time, Taney abandoned Marshall's
insistence on writing nearly everything himself; accordingly, we shall
examine the judicial product of quite a number of Justices.' 0
I. BEGINNINGS: THE THREE BOMBSHELLS OF 1837

A. New York v. Miln.
As part of a scheme for preventing immigrants from becoming
public charges, a New York statute required ship captains to furnish
local authorities with a list of all passengers they brought into the
state.1" Over Story's dissent, the Court held that this requirement did
12
not conflict with Congress' power to regulate foreign commerce.
Four Marshall decisions had touched on the negative effects of the
commerce clause on state authority, but none had clearly struck down a
state law on commerce clause grounds. Gibbons v. Ogden'3 had invalidated a state steamboat monopoly; Brown v. Marylandl4 had set aside a
tax on the privilege of selling imported goods in their original package;
Worcester v. Georgia15 had held the state could not prohibit whites
from living on the Cherokee Reservation; Willson v. Black Bird Creek
Marsh Co. 16 had allowed the damming of a navigable stream. The first
three cases variously intimated that the commerce clause might have a
10. The best general Court histories of the period as a whole are 5 C. SWISHER, rupra note 3.
and 2 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY (rev. ed. 1932). Biogra-

phies of Justices of the time include H. CONNOR, JOHN ARCHIBALD CAMPBELL (1920); Curtis,
Memoir ofBenjamin Robbins Curtis, LL.D., in 1 A MEMOIR OF BENJAMIN ROBBINS CURTIS (B.R.
Curtis, Jr. ed. 1879 & photo reprint 1970); G. DUNNE, JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY AND THE RISE OF
THE SUPREME COURT (1970); J. FRANY, JUSTICE DANIEL DISSENTING (1964); A. LAWRENCE,
JAMES MOORE WAYNE, SOUtHEr UNIONIST (1943); J. MCCLELLAN, JOSEPH STORY AND THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1971); C. SWISHER, ROGER B. TANEY (1935); F. WEISENBURGER, THE
LIFE OF JOHN MCLEAN (1937).
11. Act of Feb. 11, 1824, ch. 37, 1824 N.Y. Laws 27.
12. New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837). The statute also required the master to
post a bond to cover expenditures if the immigrant became a public charge, and to remove him
from the country in such event. Act of Feb. 11, 1824, ch. 37, §§ II, III, 1824 N.Y. Laws 27, 27-28.
The suit in Min did not involve these provisions, and the Court did not rule on them. See Mi/n,
36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 144-45 (Thompson, J., concurring).
13. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
14. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827).
15. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).

16. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829).
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negative effect of its own, but each also recited alternative grounds of
decision. In Willson, stressing that no federal statute forbade construction of the dam, Marshall concluded that the law in question could not,
"under all the circumstances of the case, be considered as repugnant to
17
the power to regulate commerce in its dormant state."
All four Justices who wrote in Miln took these precedents quite
seriously."' Barbour, a "states-right's Virginian"1 9 appointed just the
year before Miln, wrote for the Court a relatively straightforward opinion leaving open the question whether Congress possessed exclusive
authority to regulate commerce. 20 The Court had already acknowledged in Gibbons that the states could constitutionally affect commerce
by such exercises of the police power as quarantine and inspection
laws;2 ' the law requiring a passenger list was similarly a police measure
designed to protect the welfare qf New Yorkers by keeping down the
tax burden.2- A state had as much right to guard against "the moral
pestilence of paupers, vagabonds, and possibly convicts," Barbour added crudely, as against "the physical pestilence" of infected crews and
cargo. 23 Thompson's literate concurrence added a citation to Willson,
in which Marshall had apparently elevated his police power dictum
into a holding.2 Thompson also questionably took Wilson as authority that Congress' power to regulate commerce itself was not
exclusive. 25
17. Id at 252. For discussion of these cases, see Currie, States and Congress, 1801-1835,
supra note 1, at 938-56.
18. The official report contains the opinions of Barbour, Thompson, and Story. Miln, 36 U.S.
(I IPet.) at 130, 143, 153. Baldwin later published a separate opinion. See infra note 25. For the
Marshall Court's contrasting tendency to ignore precedent, see Currie, States and Congress, 18011835, supra note 1. at 972-73.
19. See C. SWISHER, supra note 10, at 139, 360; 5 C. SwisHER, supra note 3, at 56.
20. Mi/n, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 132.
21. Id at 133, 141-42 (citing Gibbons); see Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 205 (Marshall
CJ.). For criticism of this distinction as an original matter, see Currie, States and Congress, 18011835, supra note 1, at 945-46.
22. Mi/n, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 141. New York had passed the law, wrote Barbour, "to prevent
her citizens from being oppressed by the support of multitudes of poor persons ... [without] the
means of supporting themselves." Id
23. Id at 142-43. In distinguishing Brow v. Maryland, Barbour added unnecessarily that,
unlike goods, persons "are not the subject of commerce." Id at 136. This remark was later to be
the focus of serious controversy within the Court. See infra text accompanying notes 227-29 (discussing the PassengerCases).
24. See Wilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 149-50 Currie, Siatesand Congress,1801.1835,supra note
1, at 946-47.
25. Mi/n, 36 U.S. (II Pet.) at 149-53. Thompson expressly refrained from deciding the extent
of Congress' power over commerce, but at one point he seemed to suggest Congress might lack
capacity to legislate with respect to passengers already landed. Id at 146-47. Baldwin later made
the same point explicitly in a long and boring statement. See 36 U.S. (IIPet.) at 152-53o (3d ed.
'884), oriMalypublihedin H. BALDWrN, A GENERAL VIEW OF THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF
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In dissent, Story agreed that the states could affect commerce by
exercising their police powers and seemed to concede that therefore
they could exclude paupers. 26 He argued, however, that the passenger
list requirement did more than affect commerce: it regulated commerce
itself, namely "the conduct of masters, and owners and passengers, in
foreign trade." 27 Though the states might pass health laws and other
police power measures, said Story, they "cannot make a regulation of
commerce, to enforce" them,28 for Gibbons had settled that Congress
29
had exclusive power to regulate commerce.
Gibbons, of course, had settled no such thing. As Thompson
pointed out in his concurrence, 30 Gibbons held only that state law must
yield when it contradicted a federal statute-Marshall's suggestions
about the exclusivity of the commerce power were obiter as well as
inconclusive. 3 ' Moreover, Story's position seems inconsistent both with
his own concessions about the exclusion of paupers and with Marshall's
discussion of quarantine laws in Gibbons. A law excluding paupers or
quarantining vessels is no less a regulation of commerce than is a requirement that the master provide a passenger list. Indeed, as Barbour
noted,3 2 the statute in Miln required delivery of the list after the passengers landed, while the quarantine and exclusion laws interrupted
transportation itself. If such interruptions are acceptable because they
are enacted under the police power label, the list requirement should be
THE CONSTITUTION AND GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 181 (1837), reprintedin 9 L. Ed.

961 (1883 ed.). Baldwin explained that later events had caused him to abandon his "intention" of
"a silent concurrence," and that he had also abandoned a plan to publish the opinion "in an
appendix" to the official reports. See 9 L. Ed. at 873, 928. It thus is unclear whether Baldwin ever
considered the statement an actual concurring opinion. Cf 2 C. HAINES & F. SHERWOOD, THE
ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS 1835-1864, at 46 n.61

(1957) (statement "accidentally omitted").
Justice Wayne later asserted that Thompson, initially assigned to write for the Court. could
not secure the needed majority "on account of some expressions... concerning the power of
Congress to regulate commerce." Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 431 (1849) (separate

opinion).
26. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 156.
27. id at 157.

28. Id at 156.
29. Id at 158. Story also argued the state law was contrary to federal statutes he read as
"authorizling]... the introduction of passengers into the country." Id at 158-59. As both Barbour and Thompson noted, however, these statutes seemed remote from the issue: they regulated
shipboard safety and required delivery of passenger lists to federal authorities for customs and
census purposes. Id at 138, 146.
30. Id-at- 145.
31. See Currie, States and Congress,1801-1835, supra note 1, at 942-46.
32. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 142.
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Story stood alone in dissent, but he invoked his departed leader for
support. Marshall had heard the arguments before he died and had
agreed, said Story, that the New York law fell "directly within the principles established" by Gibbons and Brown v. Maryland.34 This remarkable breach of the confidentiality of Court deliberations has led at least
one commentator to accuse Story of misrepresenting Marshall's position. 35 None of Marshall's other former colleagues stepped up to dispute Story's account, however; more likely, the Chief Justice had begun
to regret his broad concessions to the states' police power.
Even if Story was right that Marshall would have joined his dissent in Miln, the majority opinion does not seem to represent the sudden break with Marshall's earlier jurisprudence that Story claimed. On
the contrary, the majority seems. to have applied Marshall's own declared principles fairly and accurately to sustain state power in an easy
36
case.
B.

Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky.

The Bank of Kentucky, a corporation owned and controlled by the
state, issued a negotiable instrument payable to the bearer in exchange
for Briscoe's promissory note. When the Bank sued to collect on the
note, Briscoe defended on grounds of illegal consideration, arguing that
the instrument issued by the bank had offended the provision of article
I, section 10, that "[n]o State shall. . . emit Bills of Credit." 37 The
state courts rejected this argument, and the Supreme Court affirmed,
38
once again over Story's solitary dissent.
As in Miln, the Court's opinions dealt largely with precedent. Only
33. One of the weaknesses of Marshall's thesis was that the police power concept was hardly
self-defining. The Court made no serious effort in Miln or elsewhere to define it, but even Story's
dissent conceded that "poor laws" and the exclusion of paupers were police power measures. Id

at 156.
34. Id at 161. Confirming this account without citation, Marshall's biographer added that
Johnson and Duvall had taken the same position, but that the former's absence prevented a decision. 4 A. BEVERIDGE, THE LwFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 583 (1919).
35. See McGovney, A Supreme CourtFiction.: Corporationsin the Diverse Citizenship Jurisdicton of the FederalCourts, 56 HARV. L REV. 853, 877-78 (1943).
36. See J. NowAx, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTTmIONAL LAW 247

(1978); 2 C. WARREN, supra note 10, at 27. Chancellor Kent, however, agreed with Story. I J.
KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMmucAN LAW 439 n.b (4th ed. New York 1840) (1st ed. New York
1826). See also R. NEWMYER, THE SUPREME COURT UNDER MARSHALL AND TANEY 102 (1968),

contending, among other things, that Min "flatly contradicted the Gibbons opinion which gave
federal law priority in case of conflict," but not identifying any conflicting federal law.
37. U.S. CONsT. art. I. § 10, cl. 1.
38. Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 257 (1837).
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seven years earlier, in Craigv. Missouri,39 the Court had divided four to

three in striking down certificates issued by Missouri under the bills of
credit clause. Story's dissent focused on Marshall's broad interpretation of the clause in that case: "'it must comprehend the emission of
any paper medium by a state government, for the purposes of common
circulation.' "40 In a sparkling display of scholarship, Story gave numerous examples of early issues of paper that had been denominated
"bills of credit" even though they were not legal tender, even though
special funds were established for their redemption, even though they
were payable to bearer on demand, even though they involved no explicit pledge of government credit, and even though they were acceptable in payment of taxes. 4' Experience had shown, he argued, that none
of these devices sufficed to prevent depreciation in value, the mischief
the bills of credit clause was designed to prevent. 42 Finally, if the state
could do through a wholly-owned corporation what it could not do di'43
rectly, "the prohibition is a dead letter. It is worse than a mockery.
Marshall, he noted once again, had agreed that the law in Briscoe was
unconstitutional.44
Responding for the majority, Justice McLean acknowledged that
the bills to which the Framers objected had included those payable on
demand, chargeable to a fund, or not made legal tender, and that a
state could not issue bills of credit indirectly through a corporation.45
However, he concluded, in contrast to Craig, the bank in Briscoe had
issued the instrument on its own credit, not on that of the state. Unlike
the state itself, the bank could be sued without its consent, and thus all
its assets could be seized to satisfy the obligation. 46 Thompson, concurring again, put the same point clearly and concisely:
39. 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 410 (1830); see Currie, States and Congress, 1801-1835, supra note 1,at
960-64.
40. Briscoe, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 329 (Story, J., dissenting) (quoting Craig,29 U.S. (4 Pet.) at

432 (Marshall, C.J.)). In contrast to Craig,the facts in Briscoe did not suggest the possibility that
the state had, in effect, issued a promissory note for borrowed money, which all agreed it could do.
concurring); id at 331 (Story, J., dissentSee Briscoe, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 327-28 (Thompson, J.,
ing); Craig, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) at 431-32 (Marshall, CJ.); id at 443 (Johnson, J., concurring); id at
455-56 (McLean, J., dissenting).
41. Briscoe, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 333-39.

42. Id at 339.
43. Id at 348.
44. Id at 328; see also 4 A. BEVERJDGE, supra note 34, at 583 (without citation).
45. Briscoe, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 312-13, 318, 319.

46. Id at 321. In this connection it may be significant that the Framers forbade only states
and not private bankers from issuing paper money. The state court had said only that Craigwas
"distinguishable in at least one important and essential particular" without saying what that particular was. Briscoe v. Bank of the Commonwealth, 30 Ky. (7 J.J. Marsh.) 349, 349 (1832).
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The two great infirmities wlich attended the bills of credit which
circulated as money, and come within the mischief intended to be
guarded against by the constitutional prohibition, were the want of
some real and substantial fund being provided for their payment and
redemption, and no mode provided for enforcing payment ... , [as
the agent who signed the bills] could not. . . be made personally
iheir credit
responsible... ; and the State was not suable ....
depended solely upon the faith and voluntary will of the State; and
were therefore purely bills of credit. But that is not the situation or
character of the bills of the bank in question. There is an ample fund
provided for their redemption, and they are issued by a corporation
which can be sued, and payment enforced in the courts of justice. 47

Story answered the majority by arguing that the opportunity to sue
the bank was an illusory safeguard because the state could abolish the
bank, reclaim its assets, and leave the holders of bank paper without
remedy.' 8 The conclusion that such a course would have been constitutional seems hasty: although the bank could hardly object to anything

the state might do with its own property, destruction of the bank's ability to pay might well have impaired its contractual obligation to the bill

holder in violation of an adjacent clause of article I, section 10. 49 Even
so, Story might have responded, the state could not be sued to undo its
misdeed; whether the holder could collect his due would depend upon
whether any state officer was suable under the uncertain criteria laid
down by Marshall in Osborn v. Bank of the United States5" and Gover-

nor of Georgia v. Madrazo. 1
47. Briscoe, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 327-28. As in Miln, see supra note 25, the third edition of the

official reports contains a long and boring concurring opinion by Baldwin that did not appear in
the original. 36 U.S. (I1 Pet.) at 327-28s (3d ed. 1884), originallypublishedinH. BALDWIN, supra

note 25, at 113-34, reprintedin 9 L. Ed. 928 (1883 ed.). The only Justice to join both Craig and
Briscoe, Baldwin explained that he had disagreed with Marshall's broad definition at the time
Craigwas decided, but had been too busy and too new on the job to express a separate opinion. 36
U.S. (II Pet.) at 327-28 (3d ed. 1884). He had gone along in striking down the Missouri paper
because, unlike the one in Briscoe, it had been issued on the credit of the state itself and had been
made legal tender for certain debts. Id at 328-28b. In contrast to McLean and Thompson, Baldwin gave no reasons for his apparently paradoxical contention that it was better if the state did not
promise to redeem. The Court had already rejected his legal-tender argument in Craig; quite
apart from Story's impressive contradictory history in Briscoe, that argument made the bills of
credit clause entirely redundant.
48. Briscoe, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 344-45.
49. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, l. ("No State shall. . .pass any. . . Law impairing the
Obligation of Contracts... ."); see Curran v. Arkansas, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 304, 319-20 (1853)
(removal of assets from state-owned bank impaired obligations owed to its creditors).
50. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
51. 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 110 (1828); see Currie,FederalCourts, 1801-1835, supra note 1, at 695701;see also Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 527 (1858) (dictum) (state may withdraw consent to be sued in its own courts on obligations previously incurred) (discussed infra at note 83).
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The bills of credit clause is seldom heard of today; its function is
now largely supplanted in practice by federal statutes regulating the

money supply.52 Several commentators have agreed with Story that
Briscoe essentially overruled Craig and cut the heart out of the

clause, 53 but I think Briscoe was a hard case in which the opposing
54
opinions deal intelligently with the competing considerations.
C.

Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge.
In 1785 the Massachusetts legislature granted a corporate charter

to the proprietors of the Charles River Bridge, authorizing them to construct a bridge between Boston and Charlestown and to collect tolls for
a period later extended to seventy years. In 1828 the legislature authorized another company to build a second bridge adjacent to the first,
providing that the new bridge would revert to the state and become

toll-free after a maximum of six years. The proprietors of the first
bridge argued that the act authorizing the second bridge impaired the

obligation of their charter in violation of article I, section 10.55 The

56
state court held it did not, and a divided Supreme Court affirmed.

Chief Justice Taney's opinion for the Court-his first in a constitutional case-was brief, lucid, and to the point. Rejecting the natural
law notions appearing in such early cases as Calder v. Bull 7 and Fetch-

er v. Peck, 58 Taney refreshingly insisted the only question was whether
the state had promised "not to establish a free bridge at the place where
the Warren bridge is erected."'59 Common law precedents established a
rule of strict construction for public grants: "'any ambiguity in the
terms of the contract, must operate against the adventurers, and in
52. See, eg., Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533 (1869) (upholding a prohibitive
federal tax on circulating paper issued by state-chartered banks); 5 C. SWISHER, supra note 3, at
109. The clause was hardly mentioned in a treatise published as early as 1868. See T. COOLEY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 15 (1868).

53. See, eg., 1J. KEtr, supra note 36, at 407 n.a; J. McCLEu.AN, supra note 10, at 257-58; A.
McLAUGHLIN, A CONsTrtruToNAL HISTORY OF THE UNrrED STATES 463-64 (1935); R.
NEWMYER, supra note 36, at 101; F. WESMENBURGER, supra note 10, at 160.
54. The Court reaffirmedBriscoe in Woodruffv. Trapnall, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 190,205 (1850),
and Darrington v. Bank of Alabama, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 12, 16-17 (1852), both written by McLean.
55. Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420, 423-28 (1837).
56. Taney reported that the state judges had actually been equally divided and had dismissed
the complaint to allow the case to be taken to the Supreme Court. Id at 538; see Charles River
Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 24 Mass. (7 Pick.) 344 (1829). For a general discussion of the case, see S.
KuTnR, PRIVILEGE AND CREATIVE DEsTRucTION: THE CHARLES RIVER BRIDGE CASE (1971); 5
C. SWISHER, supra note 3, at 74-98.

57. 3 U.S. (3 DaIL) 386 (1798); see Currie,Supreme Court 1789-1801,supra note 1, at 871-75.
58. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810);see Currie,Statesand Congress,1801-1835,supra note 1,at
889-99.
59. CharlesAiver Biidge, 36 U.S. (II Pet.) at 539-40.
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favor of the public, and the plaintiffs can claim nothing that is not
clearly given them by the act.' "6 The charter did not say it granted an
exclusive right;61 legislatures had often authorized roads or railroads
adjacent to previously chartered turnpikes without legal challenge; 62
and the same considerations of public interest that had led Marshall to
hold in ProvidenceBank v. Billings63 that a corporate charter did not
imply a promise of tax immunity led to the conclusion that the mere
64
right to charge tolls should not imply a promise of exclusivity.
As in the other great cases of this first Taney Term, Story dissented
vehemently 65-joined this time by Thompson, 66 whose record had been
considerably less restrictive of state authority. Omitting any trace of
his earlier flirtations with natural law,67 Story argued with impressive
historical support that the law had never required strict construction of
public grants that were supported by consideration-as in the case
before him, where the proprietors had promised to keep the bridge in
good repair.6 8 As Coke and other authorities had established, a charter
implied "that the legislature shall not do any act directly to prejudice
its own grant, or to destroy its value." 69 The Court had so held in
Fletcher v. Peck,70 where it found that a conveyance of land contained
an implicit promise not to retake the property; in the case at hand construction of the second bridge had put an end to toll-paying traffic and
destroyed the value of the franchise as effectively as an express
7
revocation. '

Story seems right this time; finding an implied promise by the state
not to destroy what it had given seems no harder in Charles River
Bridge than in Fletcher itself, and Taney's competing precedent al60. Id at 544 (quoting Proprietors of the Stourbridge Canal v. Wheeley, 109 Eng. Rep. 1336,

1337 (K.B. 1831)).
61. Charles River Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 548-49.
62. Id at 551-52.
63. 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 514 (1830); see Currie, States and Congress, 1801-1835, supra note 1, at

925.
64. Charles Rer Bridge, 36 U.S. (I1Pet.) at 546-48.
65. Id at 583.

66. Id at 650.
67. See Currie, States and Congress,1801-1835, supra note 1, at 902. In this connection, it

may have been significant for Story that the case came from a state rather than a federal court.
68. CharlesRive Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 589-611.

69. Id at 617.
70. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810), cited in CharlesRiver Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 617; see
Currie, States and Congress, 1801-1835, supra note 1, at 889-99.
71. CharlesRiver Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 615-16. At common law, Story added, the grant
of a franchise to hold a market or fair or to operate a ferry was consistently held to be implicitly

exclusive; bridges were indistinguishable, and Chancellor Kent had so held. Id at 618-34.
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lowing a state to tax a corporation it had created 72 was easily distinguishable. As Justice McLean observed in his concurring opinion, 73
the ordinary tax does not in fact destroy; loose language in McCulloch
v. Maryland74 notwithstanding, Fletcher showed that even Marshall
did not believe the state could destroy its own franchise just because it
could tax it. Moreover, in interesting contrast to Marshall's bare assertion in Fletcher that a grant implied a promise not to reassert title,75
Story provided an impressive array of common law authorities for his
analogous conclusion in Charles River Bridge.76 Taney was unable to
refute him, alleging only that many owners of railroads and turnpikes
had put up with competitors-he did not say with competitors who had
charged nothing-without going to court. Unlike his Miln opinion,
77
Story's CharlesRiver dissent seems both admirable and convincing.
II.

LATER CONTRACT CLAUSE CASES

Contract clause cases dominated the Supreme Court's docket in
the Taney period even more than they had during that of Marshall.
Despite the discouraging tone of the Charles River Bridge decision,
thirty of the over one hundred constitutional decisions between 1837
and 1864 involved contract clause claims. Moreover, Taney and his
colleagues enforced the clause vigorously in many cases; it remained
72. Id at 546-48 (Taney, C.J.).
73. Id at 566-67. McLean agreed with Story that the franchise was exclusive, but he argued
there had been no contractual impairment. The state, McLean argued, had taken the bridgeowners' property without compensation, which a Massachusetts court could give them under the state
constitution; but the state had not promised it would not exercise the power of eminent domain.
McLean added that, but for Fletcher, he would not have thought the contract clause applied to
grants at all, but only to executory agreements. Id at 573.
The third edition of the reports also contains Baldwin's third consecutive long and boring
concurrence, see 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 583-83e (3d ed. 1884), of the same questionable origin as
those in Miln and Briscoe. See supra notes 25, 47. Baldwin agreed with Taney's reasoning and
recited prodigious numbers of ancient precedents about ferries in such an unfocused manner as to
make Story's more professional use of authority all the more luminous.
74. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 427 (1819); see Currie, States and Congress, 1801-1835, supra

note I, at 927-38.
75: Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 136-37.
76. See supra text accompanying note 68.
77. Webster and Kent thought Taney's decision had destroyed the contract clause. See C.
SWISHER, supra note 10, at 377-78. Later observers have tended to deny that the case represented
a sharp break with Marshall's jurisprudence, pointing to Providence Bank. See, eg., B. WRIGHT,
THE CONTRACT CAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION 63-65 (1938).

This time Story did not say Marshall had agreed with him; and while Swisher reported that
he had, C. SWISHER, supra note 10, at 363; see also 2 C. WARREN, supra note 10, at 28, one of the
lawyers in the case said he had been "credibly informed" to the contrary. See G. DUNNE, SUpra
note 10, at 364 & n.18 (1970); S. KUTLER, supra note 56, at 172-79; see also G. DUNNE, supra note
10, at 360 (questioning whether Story should have recused himself, in view of his teaching position
at Harvard University, which was entitled to a share of the tolls).

Vol 1983:4711

THE SUPREME COURT- 1836-1864

the basis of more decisions striking down state legislation than any
other clause of the Constitution. Many of the cases had no doctrinal
significance, and merely applied settled principles to yet another fact
situation; the important cases can be discussed in rather short compass.
A. Bronson v. Kinzie.
After Kinzie had mortgaged land to Bronson, the Illinois legislature enacted statutes forbidding foreclosure sales for less than twothirds of market value and giving a mortgagor and his judgment creditors a right to redeem within a year after sale. Over the lone dissent of
Justice McLean, the Court held that both laws offended the contract
clause. 78
Decided in 1843, Bronson was the first major contract clause case
since Charles River Bridge. Chief Justice Taney again wrote for the
majority, and again the opinion displayed an economy and lucidity of
style coupled with a tendency to rely on precedent. There, however,
the resemblance ended: the earlier opinion had given a niggardly interpretation of a charter, but in Bronson, joined by five of his Democratic
brethren,7 9 Taney delivered a ringing affirmation of the contract clause.
In Taney's view, the earlier Illinois law giving the mortgagee an
unrestricted right to foreclose "entered into the contract, and formed a
part of it, without any express stipulation to that effect in the deed." 80
The later statute extending the right of redemption acted "directly
upon the contract itself' by giving the mortgagor and his other creditors "an equitable estate in the premises, which neither of them would
have been entitled to under the original contract," and thus impaired
the initial obligation. 81 That the other provision requiring a sale price
at least two-thirds of the land's value "apparently acts upon the remedy" 82 did not save it; although the clause often allowed remedial alter83
ations "render[ing] the recovery of debts more tardy and difficult,"
78. Bronson v. Kinzie, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 311 (1843).
79. Thompson, Baldwin, Wayne, Catron, and Daniel joined Taney's opinion. Story and McKinley were absent. Id at 322 n.*. As we shall see, in McKinley's case absences were not at all
unusual. Story later expressed warm support for the opinion in a letter to Taney. See 2 C. WAFLREN, supra note 10, at 103.
80. Bronson, 42 U.S. (1 How.) at 319; see also id at 321.
81. Id at 319-20. The Court reaffirmed this holding in Howard v. Bugbee, 65 U.S. (24 How.)
461 (1861) (Nelson, J.).
82. Bronson, 42 U.S. (1 How.) at 320.
83. Id at 315-16. See Crawford v. Branch Bank, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 279, 282 (1849) (McLean,
J.), upholding a law retroactively authorizing banks to sue in their own names on notes payable to
their officers ("Me law is strictly remedial.... This is nothing more than carrying out the contract according to its original intendment."), and Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 527, 530
(1858), allowing a state to require holders to deposit previously-issued bonds in court before suing
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Taney endorsed the Marshall Court's condemnation of acts that "'so
change the nature and extent of existing remedies as materially to impair the rights and interests of the owner,'- 84 and commendably refused "to sanction a distinction between the right and the remedy,
which would render the provision illusive and nugatory."8 5 The twothirds law in Bronson crossed this forbidden line because "its effect is to
deprive the party of his pre-existing right to foreclose the mortgage by a
sale of the premises, and to impose upon him conditions which would
86
frequently render any sale altogether impossible."
In CharlesRiver Bridge,8 7 Taney had seized on Marshall's refusal
to infer corporate tax immunity from a mere state charter as a lever to
weaken the protections Marshall had afforded under the contract
clause. Notably, Taney did not attempt to do likewise in Bronson; but
McLean, in dissent, showed how it could be done. 88 Sturges v. Crowninshield8 9 had conceded the state's power over remedies; nobody

doubted that a state might abolish imprisonment for past debts, though
doing so "takes away a means, and often a principal means, of enforcon them, in part because the state's requirement "merely regulated the proceedings in its own
courts."
84. Bronson, 42 U.S. (1 How.) at 316 (quoting Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1 (1823));
see Currie,States and Congress, 1801-1835, -unpra note I, at 889-927.
85. Bronson, 42 U.S. (I How.) at 318; see also id at 317:
[N]o one, we presume, would say that there is any substantial difference between a retrospective law declaring a particular contract or class of contracts to be abrogated and
void, and one which took away all remedy to enforce them, or encumbered it with conditions that rendered it useless or impracticable to pursue it.
86. Id at 320. In saying all this, Taney, in best Marshall fashion, had gone further than the
case required. As he acknowledged, the mortgage in question expressly authorized a foreclosure
sale, so the case could have gone off on Justice Washington's narrower ground that when a contractual provision gave the right to a particular remedy, that remedy was a part of the obligation
itself. Id at 320-21; see Mason v. Haile, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 370, 379 (1827) (dissenting opinion);
Currie,States and Congress, 1801-1835, supra note 1, at 912-16.
Bronson was later extended to a contract lacking an express foreclosure provision. McCracken v. Hayward, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 608 (1844). In what appears to be the only constitutional opinion
he wrote for the Court in fourteen years, Justice Baldwin repeated much of what Bronson had said
already, even though, as Catron protested in his concurring opinion, there seemed to be no occasion to reach the constitutional question. Id at 617;see also Lessee of Gantly v. Ewing, 44 U.S. (3
How.) 707, 717 (1845) (Catron, J.) (striking down a similar law on the basis of Bronson).
87. Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837).
88. McLean reached the merits reluctantly after arguing that the Court should not have
reached the constitutional questions at all The circuit court rule referring to state law seemed to
have been superseded by equity rules later adopted by the Supreme Court; furthermore, the old
rule by its own terms made the two-thirds law applicable only to legal and not to equitable proceedings. Bronson, 42 U.S. (I How.) at 322-23. McLean's charge that the Court was reaching out
to make an unnecessary constitutional pronouncement suggested yet another unfortunate parallel
between Taney and Marshall; however, it received no reply.
89. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819); see Currie,Statesand Congress,1801-1835, supra note 1,
at 910-16.
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ing... payment," or shorten the period of suing on existing contracts,
though doing so "bars the right of action. ' 90 "[S]urely," McLean reasoned, "the exercise of the lesser power, by modifying the remedy at
discretion, must also be constitutional." 91 Indeed, though McLean did
not say so, Marshall had conceded both of his examples in Sturges; and
the Court had actually upheld the state's power to abolish debtors'
92
prison retroactively in Mason v. Haile.
McLean's attempt to distinguish the Court's best precedent was
lame, 93 but Marshall had asked for trouble in Sturges by making such
broad concessions about the power to alter remedies. Whether the
measures endorsed in Sturges were less intrusive than Illinois's twothirds rule, moreover, Taney did not bother to say.94 Ninety years later
his successors would uphold a law authorizing two-year extensions of a
redemption period and suspension of the right to a deficiency judgment;95 even without this glaring contrast, it is difficult to argue that
96
Bronson was hostile to the contract clause.
90. Bronson, 42 U.S. (1 How.) at 328 (McLean, ., dissenting).
91. 1d; see C. SwIsHER, supra note 10, at 387-88 (terming McLean's position "odd.

.

. in

view of the conservative ideas on property rights which he was known to hold" and opining that
his convictions may have yielded- to his "perennial hopes of achieving the presidency").
92. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 370 (1827).
93. Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1 (1823), had struck down squatter laws impairing
the rights of landowners although conceding that they went only to the remedy. McLean argued
that Green involved an interstate compact and not the Constitution, Bronson, 42 U.S. (1 How.) at
327-28, but the Court had treated the compact as a contract protected against impairment by the
contract clause.
McLean's analogy to the right of a court applying foreign law to employ its own procedures,
id at 329-30, was both intrusive and restrictive; in theory the court was expected not to interfere
with vested rights under the guise of procedure. See generall, 3 J. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 584.1 (1935); J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 556-

58, at 468-70 (Boston 1834).
94. Taney conceded that a state could retroactively exempt tools or household furniture from
execution,Bronson,42 U.S. (I How.) at 315, but did not say why such measures were less destructive of the right than the two-thirds rule. See B. WRIGHT, supra note 77, at 70 ("This opinion does
little more than say that the change in the remedy must, in the opinion of the Court, be a reasonable one.").
95. Home Bldg. & Loan As'n v. Blaisdel, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
96. See C. SwisHER supra note 10, at 389 (Bronson "quieted the last of the fears that the
court would eventually overthrow the major doctrines of Taney's predecessor"); 2 C. WARREN,

supra note 10, at 103 (Bronson "carried Marshall's view of obligation of contract even further than
Marshall had himself"); Harris, ClufJustice Tane . Prophet of Reform and Reaction, 10 VAND.
L. REv. 227,238 (1957);see a/so Curranv. Arkansas, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 304,319-20 (1853) (Curtis,
J.) (relying on Bronson in holding that the withdrawal of all realty from a state-owned bank
impaired its obligations to its creditors by leaving them without remedy). But see Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 527, 529-30 (1858) (Taney, CJ.) (dictum) (Court unanimously said a state
would be free to withdraw its consent to be sued on bonds previously issued).
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West River Bridge Co. v. Dix.

B.

In 1795 Vermont granted an exclusive one hundred year franchise
to build and operate a toll bridge. In 1843 a Vermont county court
ordered the bridge taken for public use on payment of $4000. In an
1848 opinion by Justice Daniel,9 7 over Justice Wayne's dissent, the

Supreme Court held that the taking had not constituted an impairment
98
of the bridge company's contract.
This result may not seem surprising; not only the state courts cited
by Daniel99 but even the rigid Justice Story had acknowledged that a
state could take bridge franchises, like any other property, on payment
of just compensation.100 Yet neither Daniel nor Story gave a satisfactory answer to the crucial question earlier posed by Justice Johnson in
his concurrence to Fletcher v. Peck:101 how could the exercise of emi.nent domain be reconciled with the Fletcher holding that the state had
implicitly promised not to take back the property it had granted?
Vermont's counsel came up with a promising response: the grantor had agreed only that it would not impair the grant, and compensation gave the grantee the equivalent of his original right.102 There was
something to Webster's riposte that compensation was not really the
same as the franchise itself;10 3 the owner might have preferred not to
sell his rights, and the traditional availability of specific performance of
land contracts suggests the inadequacy of damages in this area. The
basis of Fletcher'simplied promise, however, was the reasonable expectations of the parties; in these terms a promise not to steal property is
much easier to infer than a promise not to buy it at a fair price. In
refusing to infer a promise not to tax a corporation, ProvidenceBank v.
Billings104 had shown that a grant did not imply rights superior to those
of others similarly situated; and Charles River Bridge had refused to
97. Daniel had replaced Barbour in 1841. See supra note 2.
98. West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507 (1848).

99. Id at 534-35.
100. Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420, 644 (1837) (dissenting

opinion).
101. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 143 (1810) (concurring opinion); see Currie, States and Congress,
1801-1835, supra note 1, at 889-99.
102. West River Bridge, 47 U.S. (6 How.) at 525 (Mr. Phelps); see Hale, The Supreme Court
andthe ContractClaus.r 11, 57 HARV. L. REv. 621,638-39 (1944) (arguing that retaking a granted

franchise might "be regarded as a breach" rather than an impairment of the obligation and citing
Hays v. Port of Seattle, 251 U.S. 233 (1920), as establishing that the state had the option under the

contract clause of breaking its agreement and paying damages).
103. West River Bridge, 47 U.S. (6 How.) at 517 (Messrs. Webster & Collamer).
104. 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 514 (1830); see Currie, States and Congress, 1801-1835, supra note 1, at

925.
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infer a promise not to undermine the value of a bridge franchise even
without compensation. 0 5
Justice Daniel, however, invoked neither these precedents nor the
cogent arguments of counsel. After describing eminent domain (without citation) as an essential attribute of "every sovereign political community,"1o6 he insisted without further explanation that the franchise
implicitly provided for its exercise. 0 7 Thus Daniel reached by pure fiat
a conclusion he could easily have justified; and, by finding an implicit

reservation of the taking power instead of simply declining to find an
implied promise not to exercise it, he made the issue look harder than it
was.10 8

Moreover, the argument that Fletcher'simplicit promise not to destroy a grant does not prevent a compensated taking seemed to require

an examination into the adequacy of the compensation. Nevertheless,
though the franchisee's counsel had argued that the price paid was
grossly insufficient,' °9 Daniel expressly declined to undertake that inquhry"O Indeed he never clearly said, though Fletcher would seem to

require it, that compensation had to be paid at all. Thus, although the
general principle established in West River Bridge appears both reasonable as a matter of contract interpretation and in accord with prece-

dent, the majority opinion gave the states an easy means of
circumventing Fletcher v. Peck without even adverting to that decision.
105. See supra notes 55-77 and accompanying text.
106. Wet River Bridge, 47 U.S. (6 How.) at 531.
107. Despite a general statement that "all private rights" were held subject to the power of
eminent domain, id at 532, Daniel did not say the state could not validly promise to waive the
exercise of its power. As he saw the case, the state had not attempted to make such a promise.
Thus there seems no basis for the apparent suggestion in B. WRiOHT, supra note 77, at 66-67, that
the issue was "the inalienability of the right of eminent domain," for the flat statement in J.NowAx, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG,supra note 36, at 423, that West River Bridge held the power

inalienable, or for the conclusion in J. FRANK,supra note 10, at 210-12, that the case established a
"police-power limitation on the contract clause." q infra text accompanying notes 130-52 (discussion of contractual tax immunities).
108. Woodbury, who had replaced Story in 1845, said much the same thing in a concurring
opinion, adding unnecessarily that he doubted any necessity could justify taking private property
for uses such as marine hospitals and jails. West River Bridge, 47 U.S. (6 How.) at 546. He also
said, even less relevantly, that he thought a state could modify at will a contract of employment of
a public officer. Id at 548; see infra notes 111-29 and accompanying text (discussing Butler v.
Pennsylvania, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 402 (1850)). McLean, as in CharlesRiver Bridge, concurred on
the ground that a taking of property was not an impairment of contract. West River Bridge, 47
U.S. (6 How.) at 536-39. Justice Wayne was reported to have "delivered a dissenting opinion,"
but its contents were not revealed. Id at 549.
109. West River Bridge, 47 U.S. (6 How.) at 513, 520 (placing the value of the franchise at
S10.000).
110. Id at 535.
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C. Butler v. Pennsylvania.
Less than a year after appointing Butler a canal commissioner "for
the term of one year" with "all the rights, powers, and emoluments of
the said office" under a statute providing a compensation of four dollars per day, the state of Pennsylvania reduced his salary and then replaced him entirely."' The state courts rejected the argument that this
conduct had impaired the contractual obligation.112 In 1851 the
Supreme Court affirmed, without dissent on the merits, in another
1 13
opinion by Justice Daniel.

Pennsylvania case law, which Daniel cited,' 14 emphatically denied
that public officers enjoyed a contractual relation with the state, and
ever since Ogden v. Saunders" 5 the Court had proceeded on the premise that the existence and extent of an obligation depended on the law
in effect at the time the obligation allegedly arose. Thus, having
checked that the Pennsylvania decisions were not latter-day concoctions to evade the contract clause," 6 the Court could easily have justified its decision on the ground that the governing stite law created no
obligation.
Daniel took a broader approach, however, concluding that appointments, of state.officers "do not come within the import of the term
contracts" in the Constitution." 7 The contract clause, he said (again
without citation), applied only to "contracts by whichpeifect rights, certain dfnite,fixedprivate rights of property, are vested";' 8 "from the
necessity of the case, and according to universal understanding," engagements "undertaken by the body politic or State government for the
benefit of all" could be varied at will.1 19 A contrary holding would be
"reconcilable with neither common justice nor common sense"; it
would either "arrest necessarily every thing like progress or improve111. Butler v. Pennsylvania, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 402, 403-05 (1850).
112. Id at 405-06.
113. Justice McLean argued that there was no contract to be impaired and thus no jurisdic-

tion; the logic of this position suggests that the Court never has jurisdiction to reject a constitutional claim on the merits. ld at 419.
114. Id at 517-18.
115. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827); see Currie, Slates and Congress, 1801-1835, Supa note 1,
at 917-23.
116. Cf.Indiana ex rel Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 100 (1938) (whether the state has
bound itself by contract is a question "primarily of state law" which the Court should review only
with deference "in order that the constitutional mandate may not become a dead letter"); Infra
notes 136-52 and accompanying text (discussing Piqua Branch of State Bank v. Knoop,57 U.S.
(16 How.) 369 (1854)).
117. Butter, 51 U.S. (10 How.) at 417.
118. Id at 416.
119. Id
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ment in government" or turn the state into "one great pension establishment on which to quarter a host of sinecures."1 20 The regulation
and appointment of state officers, he added, were "functions.... which
governments cannot be presumed to have surrendered, if indeed they
can under any circumstances be justified in surrendering them."' 21
There is in these passages a strong echo of Marshall's habit of concluding that the Framers have done no wrong. 122 There is the bare
assertion that foisting "sinecures" on the public payroll is worse than
breaking faith with one's employees.1 23 There is the unsupported attribution of this same set of values to those who wrote into the Constitution an explicit requirement that the states keep their promises. There
is no-attempt to reconcile the broad conclusion that the contract clause
is inapplicable to engagements "for the benefit of all" with the
Dartmouth College case, which had held that a charter granted to an
eleemosynary institution for the public good was protected by the Constitution, 124 or to explain why the canal commissioners in Butler had
rights any less "perfect," "definite," "fixed," "vested," or "private" than
those of Dartmouth itself. The Court could have made a respectable effort along this line.
Marshall had conceded in Dartmouth that the contract clause did not
"restrain the states in the regulation of their civil institutions, adopted
for internal government,"125 and even Story had acknowledged that
states could abolish municipal corporations. 26 On the other hand, as
Justice Washington had explained, in the case of a municipal corporation the state was essentially contracting with itself.127 Butler, in con120. Id
121. Id at 417. These last passages confused the basis of the holding by suggesting two

grounds distinct from the question of what constituted a "contract" within the meaning of the
clause. Daniel's statement that the state's surrender of power to alter an officer's salary "cannot be
presumed" seemed to suggest a narrow interpretation of the agreement itself, id; his doubt
whether the state could make such a surrender seemed to echo the undeveloped suggestion of both
Marshall and Johnson in Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810), that the state constitution
might limit the authority of the state government to contract away its sovereign powers. Cf infra
notes 130-52 and accompanying text (discussing contractual tax exemptions).
122. See Merrill, Application of the Obl'gationof Contract Clause to State Promises, 80 U. PA.
L. REv. 639, 656 (1932) (arguing that the "considerations of policy set forth in [Butler]. . . seem
unanswerable"). See generally Currie,FederalCourts, 1801-1835, spra note 1; Currie, Statesand
Congress,1801-1835, supra note 1.
123. Butler, 51 U.S. (10 How.) at 416.
124. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819); see Currie,
States and Congress,1801-1835, supra note 1, at 905-10.
125. Dartmouth, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 629.
126. Id at 694 (concurring opinion); see also Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43, 52
(1815); Currie, States and Congress,1801-1835, supra note 1, at 901-05.
127. Dartmouth, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 661 (concurring opinion).
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trast, also involved the interests of the officers themselves, and Story
had admitted that an agreement to pay an officer a stipulated salary
128
would fall within the contract clause.
In short, as in West River Bridge, Daniel could have written a persuasive opinion to justify his decision sustaining state authority; but,129as
in West River Bridge, he elected to rely on bare assertions instead.
D.

The Tax Exemption Cases.
With the conspicuous exception of Bronson v. Kinzie,130 all the
opinions discussed so far display a marked hostility to the contract
clause; and only Bronson involved a contract between private parties.
The tempting inference that the Taney Court distinguished sharply between public and private contracts, however, is severely weakened by
that Court's sympathetic approach to state promises not to impose
taxes.
The Marshall Court had enforced a state promise not to impose
taxes as early as 1812 inNew Jersey v. Wilson.13' In 1845, in Gordon v.
Appeal Tax Court, 32 the Taney Court unanimously enforced another,
construing a promise not to impose additional taxes on banks to forbid
taxation of their shareholders.133 Though perhaps correct, 34 this inter128. Id at 694. Story had left the Court before the Butler decision, and no Justice picked up
his argument. Daniel's apparent view that no agreements of public employment were within the
contract clause has not survived. See, e.g., Indianaex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 99-100
(1938); Hale, supra note 102, at 666-70.
129. Justice Woodbury's opinion the same term for a unanimous Court in Town of East Hartford v. Hartford Bridge Co., 51 U.S. (10 How.) 511 (1850), provides an interesting contrast to
Butler. Woodbury invoked both Washington's and Story's Dartmouth opinions to reach the less
controversial conclusion that the state could rescind a ferry right it had granted to a municipal
corporation. Id at 536. However, the broad holding of East Har/ordthat arrangements between
states and their subdivisions lay outside the contract clause was unnecessary in light of the alternative conclusion of estoppel: the city had earlier admitted it held the ferry at legislative pleasure.
Id at 537. Woodbury also added both that the legislature had no power to surrender the right to
retract its franchises, id at 534-35, and that it had implicitly reserved power to modify the arrangement as public need dictated. Id at 536-37. Both these points seemed equally applicable to
grants to private parties, and in that context they appeared to conflict with all the precedents
refusing to allow alteration of public grants; but they were both quite unnecessary to the decision.
130. 42 U.S. (I How.) 311 (1843); see supra text accompanying notes 78-96.
131. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 164 (1812); see Currie, States and Congres, 1801-1835, supra note 1,
at 899-900.
132. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 133 (1845).
133. The promise was found in a statute providing that if existing banks would invest in a
proposed turnpike and pay an annual sum of twenty cents per hundred dollars of capital stock,
"the faith of the state is hereby pledged not to impose any further tax or burden upon them during
the continuation of their charters under this act." See Id at 146.
134. Counsel had argued that the exemption would otherwise become worthless. Gordon, 44
U.S. (3 How.) at 139. Wayne said the condition that the exemption take effect on acceptance by
"the bank" showed the legislature had equated the institution with its owners, since they alone
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pretation was hardly compelled by clear language; the decision seemed
to show that, despite CharlesRiver Bridge, the Taney Court would not
always take a restrictive view of promises in public contracts. 135 The
major 1854 case of Piqua Branch of State Bank v. Knoop1 36 demonstrated that the Gordon decision was no mere sport.137 Ohio had

passed a statute authorizing any group of five or more persons to form
a banking corporation, requiring any bank so organized to pay the state

six percent of its net profits semiannually, and providing that this
amount "shall be in lieu of all taxes to which such company, or the
stockholders thereof on account of stock owned therein, would otherwise be subject."' 138 The Ohio courts upheld a later statute taxing the
capital stock, surplus, and contingent fund of such banks. The Supreme

Court, in an opinion by McLean, reversed.
As Campbell pointed out in. a well-written and well-documented
dissent joined by Catron and Daniel, 39 the state had not explicitly
promised that the taxing arrangement in the 1845 statute would remain
unaltered by subsequent legislation.'4 In contrast to the pledge in
Gordon to impose no further tax on banks "during the continuance of
their charters," the assurance in Piqua, by which the state had only

declared that the semiannual payments should be "in lieu of all taxes,"
could agree to the terms of the bargain. Id at 147-48. Professor Wright termed Wayne's conclusion "very doubtful" B. WRiGHT, supra note 77, at 183.
135. Indeed, Wayne rejected an argument that the exemption applied only to franchise taxes
on the ground that the banking franchise itself, unlike land acquired from the state, would have
been implicitly exempt in the absence of an express provision: the bank paid a price for the
privilege, "and any tax upon it would substantially be an addition to the price." Gordon, 44 U.S.
(3 How.) at 146. Despite Wayne's disclaimer, this argument would appear equally applicable to
every sale of state land, or for that matter to every corporate charter for which there is consideration (though Wayne explicitly denied this application, id at 145-46). This incidental conclusion
that bank franchises possessed implicit immunity from taxes seemed not only out of harmony with
the principles of construction set forth and applied in CharlesRiver Bridge, but also irreconcilable
with Marshall's holding in Providence Bank v. Billings that the mere grant of a charter did not
imply an exemption from state taxes. Providence Bank, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) at 560-65; see Currie,
States and Congress,1801-1835, supra note 1, at 925; see also supra text accompanying note 63.
136. 57 U.S. (16 How.) 369 (1854).. For the background and aftermath of this controversy, see
2 C. HAtNEs & F. SHERWOOD, supra note 25, at 370-89; 2 C. WARREN, upra note 10, at 474-81.
137. In 1842 the Court had held that a statute making the property of a state university "forever" tax free was implicitly repealed by a later law authorizing sale to private parties. Armstrong
v. Treasurer of Athens County, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 281 (1842) (Catron, J.). Unlike the otherwise
similar exemption in New Jersey v Wdson, II U.S. (7 Cranch) at 166-67, the exemption in.Annstrong had not been a part of the consideration for a private grant protected by the clause. Cf
Philadelphia & Wilmington R.R. v. Maryland, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 376,382-83 (1850) (Taney, CJ.)
(statute authorizing merger and continuing "all.. . privileges" of predecessor corporations did
not extend tax immunity of one predecessor to all the property of the new firm).
138. Piqua, 57 U.S. (16 How.) at 377.
139. Id at 395, 405.
A
1M !d at 406.
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might as easily mean "'till otherwise provided by law' as "'during
the existence of the banks' ,;141 as Campbell said, CharlesRiver Bridge
42
seemed to require a resolution of the ambiguity in favor of the state.1
In a separate dissent, Catron added a more fundamental objection:
the Ohio courts had already held that irrepealable tax exemptions were
an impermissible abandonment of sovereignty, 43 and the state courts
were the ultimate arbiters of state law.' 44 Conceding that federal courts
normally deferred to state courts in the interpretation of state law, McLean persuasively responded that the contract clause demanded an exception: to make the state sole judge of whether it had given what the
Constitution forbade it to revoke would "surrender one of the most
45
important provisions in the federal Constitution."'
On the merits, McLean noted that state legislatures and prior deci46
sions had long assumed the power to grant irrepealable exemptions'
and argued that an agreement not to tax a particular corporation no
more abrogated sovereignty than would an agreement to repay money
borrowed or the issuance of a corporate charter itself.'4 7
141. Gordon, 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 145; Piqua, 57 U.S. (16 How.) at 406.
142. Piqua, 57 U.S. (16 How.) at 409-12. Taney concurred specially to say he did not agree
with everything in the majority opinion but that "the words used are too plain" to avoid McLean's
conclusion. Id at 392-93. The companion case of Ohio Life Ins.-& Trust Co. v. Debolt, 57 U.S.
(16 How.) 416 (1854), involved the same statutes, but with a different twist and a different result.
The company was not, strictly speaking, a bank, but its charter provided it should be taxed no
more heavily than banks. Taney and Grier thought the state had agreed to give the company "the
,benefit of its general regulations and laws... but not of its special contracts" concerning bank
'taxes, id at 441, and the 1845 provision involved in Piquawas a "special contract" applicable only
to banks established under its other provisions. 1d at 439. As McLean and Curtis pointed out in
separate dissents, id at 444, 450, this seemed a peculiar construction because every bank in the
state was subject to the 1845 rate at the time the statute was passed. Once the Court had answered
the hard question in Piqua by favoring exemption, the same result should apparently have followed easily in Debolt, but with the votes of Catron, Daniel, and Campbell (who adhered to their
position that the banks themselves were taxable at the 1851 rate), the vote in Debolt was five to
four against immunity. For further discussion of Debolt, see infra note 147.
143. Piqua, 57 U.S. (16 How.) at 404 (dissenting opinion).
144; Id at 403, 405.
145. Id at 391-92 (majority opinion); accord Indianaex rel Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95
(1938); cf.Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 357 (1816) (investigating whether
title had passed under state law before a treaty Milegedly violated by expropriation); Currie, Federal Courts,1801-1835, supra note 1,at 681-87 (discussing Mar/n v. Hunter'sLessee).
146. PAqua, 57 U.S. (16 How.) at 389.
147. Id In the companion Debolt case, discussed supra at note 142, Justice Daniel joined
Catron's rejection of what Daniel trmed the "suicidal doctrine" that a legislature could "bind
foxver and irrevocably their creator," the "sovereign people." Debolt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) at 443
(Daniel, J.,
concurring in judgment). Whether this view was consistent with any legislative power
to contract he did not say. Taney, joined by Grier, wrote separately to affirm both the power of
Ohio's legislature to give irrepealable exemptions and the Court's duty to reexamine the state's
interpretation of its original action, while finding no contractual exemption on the facts. Id at
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Absent some unusual provision in the Ohio constitution-and nobody pointed to one-McLean seemed to have the better of this argument.1 48 Catron's view would reappear in dissents even on the tax
issue, 49 and the Court would later adopt it with respect to alleged
promises not to exercise the police 5o and eminent domain 5 1 powers.
During Taney's term, however, the Court not only enforced tax exemptions; it also gave them, on the whole, a reasonably broad construction' 5 2 -despite the contrary philosophy of CharlesRiver Bridge.
E. Gelpcke v. Dubuque.
Pursuant to statutory authorization, the City of Dubuque issued
bonds in exchange for shares of railroad stock. The Iowa Supreme
Court had held before the bond issue that the authorizing statute was
consistent with the state constitution; after the issue, the court reversed
itself. In a federal diversity action to recover interest, the Supreme
Court disregarded the latest state court decision and held for the
bondholders. 1 53
For the Court, Justice Swayne argued that the "settled rule" requiring respect for state court decisions "giving constructions to the
laws and constitutions of their own States" 1 54 had been held inapplicable in "exceptional cases,"' 5 5 none of which he had the grace to identify. The earlier Iowa decisions favoring the bonds were "sustained by
reason and authority" and "in harmony with the adjudications of sixteen States," and, Swayne noted, "[i]t cannot be expected that this courtwill follow every.., oscillation" in state decisions.' 56 As Taney had
said in earlier dicta, a contract valid according to contemporaneous
state interpretation "cannot be impaired by any subsequent action of

legislation, or decision of its courts altering the construction of the
427,432-33,441. Campbell once again properly found it unnecessary to decide the broader question. lid at 443-44 (separate opinion).
148. See also Hale, supra note 102, at 654.
149. See, eg., Washington Univ. v. Rouse, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 439, 443 (1869) (Miller, J., dissenting); B. WmiaHT, supra note 77, at 75.
150. See, eg., Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814 (1880).
151. See, eg., Contributors to Pennsylvania Hospital v. Philadelphia, 245 U.S. 20 (1917).
152. See Jefferson Branch Bank v. Skelly, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 436 (1862); Rector of Christ
Church v. County of Philadelphia, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 300 (1"861); Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18
How.) 331 (1856).
153. Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 68 U.S. (I WalL) 175 (1864). See general, 6 C. FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE-SuPREME COURT OF THE UNrED STATEs 935-44 (1971); C. FAIRMAN, MR. JUSTIcE
Mw.ER AND THE SUPREME COURT 213-21 (1939).

154. Geoce, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) at 206.
155. Id
156. Id at 205-06.
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"To hold otherwise," Swayne added, "would be as unjust as to

hold that rights acquired under a statute may be lost by its repeal."' 58
Whatever else may be said about Gelpcke, Swayne can hardly be
accused of having revealed the basis of his decision.15 9 Professor
Swisher has taken the Taney quotation as proof the case held that the
contract clause precluded judicial as well as legislative impairment of
agreements.' 60 Swisher's interpretation is strengthened by the fact that
Taney's remark was made in a case decided on contract clause grounds

and by a later Swayne statement that, while still ambiguous, was somewhat more explicit.

61

This interpretation suffers, however, from the

conspicuous failure of Swayne ever to mention the contract clause and
from Justice Miller's emphatic and uncontradicted assertion in dissent

that it was "not pretended" that the Iowa decision was "in conflict with
the Constitution of the United States."' 62 Indeed, the references to "exceptional cases," to "oscillation," and to the correctness of the repudiated Iowa holdings suggest the Court simply thought itself free to
depart from a state court's interpretation of its own constitution. This

conclusion, although not easy to reconcile with the many precedents
cited by Miller

63

or with the underlying Rules of Decision Act,

64

in-

dicates Ge/pcke may well have been an extension of Swift v. Tyson 165
rather than an expansive reading of the contract clause.
157. Id at 206 (citing Ohio Life Ins. & Trust Co. v. Debolt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 416, 432 (1854)
(separate opinion) (discussed supra notes 142, 147)). Taney was ill when Ge/pcke was decided and
did not sit. See 68 U.S. (I Wall.) at vii.
158. Ge/pdce, 68 U.S. (I WalL) at 206.
159. See B. WRIGHT, supra note 77, at 81 (the "constitutional justification for the [decision]
...has never been entirely clear").
160. 5 C. SWISHER, supra note 3, at 335.
161. "The National Constitution forbids the States to pass laws impairing the obligation of
contracts. In cases properly brought before us that end can be accomplished unwarrantably no
more by judicial decisions than by legislation." Township of Pine Grove v. Talcott, 86 U.S. (19
Wall.) 666, 678 (1874) (discussed infra notes 165, 169), efectively overruled, Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79-80 (1938); see also Douglass v. County of Pike, 101 U.S. 677, 687
(1879) (Waite, CJ.).
162. Ge/pcke, 68 U.S. (I Wall.) at 209; see also id at 210.
163. Id at 210-13.
164. Act of Sepi. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1652
(1976)).
165. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18-19 (1842) (Rules of Decision Act limited to "laws strictly local"),
overruled, Erie KR. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64,79-80 (1938) (state laws rules of decision in federal
courts). The Swf.t doctrine was an explicit ground of decision in the Pine Grove case. Pine Grove,
86 U.S. (19 Wall.) at 678 (see supra note 161 for quotation); see also Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan,
263 U.S. 444, 451-52 (1924); 6 C. FAIRMAN, supra note 153, at 937-38 (insisting that Swift was the
sole basis for Ge/pcke). For a defense of Ge/pc/e on this ground because of the diversity policy of
protecting outsiders from state-court bias, see Thayer, The Case cfGepce v. Dubuque, 4 HARv. L.
Ray. 311 (1891).
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If Swayne did mean to hold that the Constitution forbade judicial
impairment of contract, he had some explaining to do. The contract
clause forbids only "Law[s]" impairing obligations;'66 the Court had
167
held in Calder v. Bull that the similarly worded ex post facto clause
applied only to legislation. 168 Swayne might have invoked the purpose
of the contract clause to protect legitimate expectations, along with a
recognition that judges effectively make law by deciding cases. 169 Perhaps his failure to do any of this resulted from an inability to muster a
majority for what at the time may have seemed an unwarranted extension; it may be rough justice, if hardly consolation, that the Court gave
no better explanation when it later said the clause did not apply to
judicial decisions. 170 In any event, though Gelpcke neither clearly expanded the contract clause nor contained any acceptable justification
for-its holding, it was certainly npot unfriendly to contract rights.

F. Summary.
The cases considered above make it impossible to conclude that
the Court consistently displayed toward the clause the kind of hostility
that its crippling construction of the charter in CharlesRiver Bidge
appeared to represent. Bronson v. Kinzie showed that the new Justices
had little inclination to use Marshall's right/remedy distinction to
166. "No State shall... pass any. . . Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts ....
,U:S. CoNsT. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
167. "No State shall.. . pass any... ex post facto Law.
... Id
168. 3 U.S. (3 DalL.) 386, 392 (Chase, J.), 397 (Patterson, J.), 400 (Iredell & Cushing, JJ.)
(1798) (alternative holding); see Currie,Supreme Court, 1789-1801, supra note 1, at 870-71.
169. In other contexts the Court has since construed the term "laws" to include judge-made
law. See Erie AR, 304 U.S. at 78 (state laws rules of decision in federal courts); Illinois v. City of
Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 100 (1972) (jurisdiction of cases arising under federal law).
Swayne might also have added that Calder's contrary reading of the ex post facto clause had
been assumed rather than explained, and that a limitation on the power to overrule prior contract
decisions could more easily be attributed to the Framers than could a prohibition on appeals from
inferior courts, which was all that had been involved in Caider. Swayne's later suggestion that to
follow state decisions in cases like Geipcke would be to "abdicate one of the most important duties
with which this tribunal is charged," Pine Grove, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) at 678, echoes McLean's
correct conclusion in Pqua that to give binding effect to state decisions when legislation is attacked would emasculate the contract clause. In Gelcke, however, no legislation was under attack, the issue was the threshold question of whether judicial action could ever offend the clause.
Because the case providing Taney's dictum involved an attack on state legislation, and since Taney in the .same breath reaffirmed the point made in Piqua, Miller seems correct in saying that
Taney had not meant what Swayne appeared to cite him for in Gelpcke. See Gelpcke, 68 U.S. (1
WalL) at 216-17.
170. See New Orleans Waterworks Co. v. Louisiana Sugar Ref. Co., 125 U.S. 18, 30 (1888)
("The prohibition is aimed at the legislative power of the State, and not at the decisions of its
courts, or the acts of administrative or executive boards or officers .... ."). Because the action
involved was not that of a court, the reference to decisions was dictum.
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weaken the clause, and the tax exemption cases demonstrate they were
sometimes even generous in their interpretation of government
promises. After Marshall's refusal to infer a promise not to tax, there
was nothing radical about his successors' refusal in West River Bridge
to infer a promise not to exercise the ordinary power of condemnation.
Even the relatively extreme holding in Butler that contracts for the employment of state officers were not protected had roots in Marshall's
dictum exempting purely governmental arrangements and could easily
have been justified on the basis of state law. Though the additional
decisions not discussed here may confirm a certain inclination toward
narrow construction of public promises outside the tax exemption field,
they do not seem to alter the picture very significantly.' l7 In short,
notwithstanding Charles River Bridge and occasional extreme statements by unrepresentative Justices like Daniel and Catron, the overall
impression conveyed by the contradt cases of the Taney years is one of
continuity with the Marshall tradition.172
171. See, e.g., Bridge Proprietors v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 68 U.S. (I Wall.) 116

(1864) (Miller, J.) (imaginative opinion that exclusive bridge franchise did not preclude construction of railroad bridge that was said not to divert tollpaying foot and horse traffic); Gilman v. City
of Sheboygan, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 510 (1863) (Swayne, .) (authorization to impose certain taxes was
not part of city's contract with its bondholders); Sherman v. Smith, 66 U.S. (I Black) 587 (1862)
(Nelson, J.) (charter provision revocable because state had expressly reserved power of repeal, as
Story had said in Dartmouth); Aspinwall v. Board of Commissioners, 63 U.S. (22 How.) 364

(1860) (Nelson, J.) (railroad charter provision authorizing county to buy railroad stock gave
county no right protected by contract clause); Richmond, Fredericksburg, & Potomac R.R. v.
Louisa R.R., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 71 (1852) (Grier, 3.) (promise in one railroad franchise not to grant
another diverting traffic between terminal points not impaired by chartering another railway over
part of same distance); Baltimore & Susquehanna R.. v. Nesbit, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 395 (1850)
(Daniel, J.) (legislative new-trial order respecting particular condemnation did not impair contractual power of eminent domain); Paup v. Drew, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 218 (1850) (alternative holding)
(McLean, J.) (promise to accept banknotes for state debts inapplicable to purchase of land the
state held in trust); Phalen v. Virginia, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 163 (1850) (Grier, J.) (state may ban
lottery five years after enacting statute authorizing turnpike commissioners to operate one in order
to raise $30,000 to repair a small stretch of road); Woodruff v. Trapnall, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 190
(1850) (McLean, J.) (bank charter promising acceptance of banknotes in satisfaction of debts to
the state created a contractual obligation to noteholders); Planters' Bank v. Sharp, 47 U.S. (6
How.) 301, 306 (1848) (Woodbury, J.) (charters empowering banks either to dispose of property or
to exercise the "usual... powers" of banking institutions gave them a contractual right to trans-

fer promissory notes); Maryland v. Baltimore & O.RLtR, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 534 (1845) (Taney, C.J.)
(charter provision requiring railroad to pay penalty to county if it did not build there gave no
contractual right to the county). Many of these decisions were unanimous; but Catron, Daniel,
Taney, Nelson, and Grier each dissented from at least one case striking down state action, and
McLean, Wayne, and Curtis dissented from the upholding of state action in the Richmond case,
Richmond, F., & P.R., 54 U.S. (13 How.) at 83.
172. See B. WRIGHT, supra note 77, at 62-63, 245-46 (concluding that the contract clause was a
"more secure and a broader base for the defense of property rights in 1864 than it had been in
1835").
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HI. LATER COMMERCE CLAUSE CASES
A. Groves v. Slaughter.
In 1835 and 1836, Slaughter brought slaves into Mississippi and
sold them on credit.173 Some of his customers failed to pay and defended themselves on grounds of illegality: the Mississippi constitution
provided that the "introduction of slaves into this state, as merchandise, or for sale, shall be prohibited, from and after the first day of
May, [1833]." 174 The trial court rejected this defense, and the Supreme
175
Court, over two dissents, affirmed.
Justice Thompson's opinion for the Court scrupulously avoided
the ticklish question whether the commerce clause deprived Mississippi
of power to prohibit the importation of slaves, concluding, in the absence of clear state decisions, that its slave importation clause was 7a6
mere direction to the legislature, not a self-executing prohibition.
McLean, Taney, and Baldwin each published concurring opinions ex-'
pressing highly divergent views on the commerce clause issue, which all
three conceded did not have to be decided.' 77 Like Story in Mlif, McLean began by inflating Gibbons into a holding that Congress had exclusive power over commerce but concluded that slaves were not
articles of commerce 78 because the Constitution referred to them as
"persons."' 7 9 Responding persuasively that the clause of article I, section 9 forbidding Congress to outlaw the slave trade before 1808.
173. Groves v. Slaughter, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 449, 497 (1841).

174. Id See geiff-ally 5 C. SWISHER, supra note 3, at 366 ("the importation of slaves de-,
pressed the market value of those already held in the state" and the slave traders brought in slaves
who were "troublemakers or in other respects undesirable"); 2 C. WARREN, supra note 10, at 68
n.l (this was "a financial rather than a slavery measure," designed "to check the drain of capital
away from the state").
175. Groves v. Slaughter, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 449 (1841).

176. Id at 496-503. Surprisingly, the Court adhered to this conclusion after the Mississippi
courts decided to the contrary. See Rowan v. Runnels, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 134, 139 (1847) (Taney,
CJ.) (arguing that to give state-court decisions retroactive effect might render the diversity clause
"utterly useless and nugatory"). For cogent criticism of the Rowan decision as inconsistent with
precedent, see 2 C. HAINES & F. SHERWOOD, surqa note 25, at 120-21 (invoking Green v. Lessee of

Neal, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 291 (1832)).
177. Groves, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) at 504 (McLean, J.), 508 (Taney, CJ.), 510 (Baldwin, J.). McLean began by saying the question was "so intimately connected with" the case and had been "so

elaborately argued" that it was "fit and proper" to discuss it. Id at 504. Taney and Baldwin said
that, once McLean had spoken, they dared not let their silence be misconstrued. Id at 508 (Taney, CJ.), 510 (Baldwin, J.); see F. WEmSENBuROER, supra note 10, at 165-66 ("McLean went far
out of the usual judicial course" and "needlessly exposed ... differences ... on questions of

crucial importance.").
178. Groves, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) at 504, 506-08.
179. Id at 506 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (apportionment of representatives and direct
taxes); U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 9 (congressional power over slave trade); U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3

(fugitive slaves)); see C. Swismpie, supra note 10, at 398 (explaining that despite his nationalist
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demonstrated that slaves otherwise fell within the commerce power,

80

Baldwin admitted that a law forbidding-the importation of all slaves

could have been sustained under the police power on grounds either of
morality or safety, but argued convincingly that the purpose of the Mississippi provision was purely commercial because it forbade only importation for sale.' 81 Taney said only that the introduction of slaves
was a state matter not subject to congressional control; he did not say

why.' 82

Between the opinions of Taney and Baldwin, the reporter added

the following peculiar paragraph.
Mr. Justice STORY, Mr. Justice THOMPSON, Mr. Justice WAYNE, and
Mr. Justice M'KINLEY concurred with the majority of the Court in
opinion that the provision of the Constitution of the United States,
which gives the regulation of commerce to Congress, did not interfere with the provision of the constitution of the state of Mississippi,
which83relates to the introduction of slaves as merchandise, or for
sale.'
For Story and McKinley, who dissented from the decision that Missis-

sippi's constitution was not self-executing, Is4 the quoted paragraph
meant the state had power to forbid the importation of slaves for sale.
That Thompson and Wayne joined in this paragraph-rather than rest-

ing solely on the former's conclusion that the Mississippi provision had
no legal effect-suggests that they could not resist adding their two("Whig") views McLean was "an abolitionist... deeply interested... in preserving the power
of the state to do away with slavery").
180. Groves, 40 U.S. (15 Pet) at 513-14. McLean responded unconvincmgly, suggesting that
Congress's power over interstate commerce was narrower than its identically worded power over
foreign trade, Id at 505-06, and that, given the exclusivity of the commerce clause, § 9's recognition of state authority over slave importation until 1808 showed that the subject fell outside the
commerce clause altogether. Id at 506. The latter contention overlooked the possibility that such
state laws might fall within Marshall's conception of the police power (which McLean conceded
gave the states some authority to affect the same subject as Congress' commercial regulations, Id
at 505), as well as the Framers' explicit termination of the limitation as of 1808.
181. Groves, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) at 511-12, 516. This time, Baldwin seems to have captured the
spirit of Marshall's distinction. Cf supra notes 25, 47, 73 (discussing New York v. Miln, Briscoe v.
Kentucky, and CharlesRiver Bridge v. Warren Bridge). He was less successful, however, in suggesting a violation of the privileges and immunities clause of article IV, see Groves, 40 U.S. (15
Pet.) at 516-17, because Mississippi appeared to disapprove of importation for sale by its own
citizens as well as by outsiders. Unable to stay within the case, Baldwin also added (in anticipation of Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857)), that slaveowners were "protected from
any violations of rights of property by Congress, under the fifth amendment." Groves, 40 U.S. (15
Pet.) at 515.
182. Id at 508-09. Taney correctly noted that the exclusivity question remained open, but
then made the "astonishingly inaccurate prediction," C. SWISHmt, supra note 10, at 398, that the
Court would never have to decide it. Groves, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) at 509-10.
183. Groves, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) at 510.
184. Id at 517.
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cents-worth on the issue Thompson had so carefully and properly
avoided. None of the four, however, gave any inkling of a reason for
13 5
their conclusion.
Inconclusive as it was on the commerce clause issue, Groves did
serve to repudiate Webster's astounding assurance during argument
that "all questions" relating to the clause "are now fully settled."' 8 6 Six
of the seven participating Justices 8 7 apparently concluded that Mississippi could forbid the importation of slaves for sale; the seventh seemed
to suggest it could have excluded slaves entirely. For all but two of
them, however, this was only dicta. The three Justices who gave reasons for their decision took three distinct positions. The other four left
us to wonder whether they thought such a law valid because the commerce power was not exclusive, because of the police power theory applied in Miln, or because the subject lay wholly outside the commerce
clause.188 For those counting heads in anticipation of the inevitable
commerce clause showdown, after Groves four Justices-Johnson,
Story, McLean, and Baldwin--had gone on record that Congress had
exclusive power, and only Thompson had yet indicated the contrary.
B. License Cases.
Convicted of selling imported liquor without licenses required by
state law, the defendants in three separate cases attacked their convictions on constitutional grounds. The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed, 189 but it is difficult to say why. There was no opinion for the
Court. Of the seven Justices whose vote was reported, six wrote sepa,rate opinions; two wrote more than one. 9°
185. McKinley apparently delivered an oral opinion whose contents are unknown; Story was
absent when the decision was announced. 5 C. SwisHmR, supra note 3, at 367.

186. Groves, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) at 494.
187. Catron was absent and Barbour had died. Id at 517.
188. In a private letter Story said he had concluded that the commerce clause did not oust
state power, "admitting it to be exclusive." 5 C. SWLSHEPR, supra note 3, at 367 (quoting Letter
from Justice Story to Robert J. Walker 2 (May 22, 1841) (available in New York Historical Society Library)). Professor Swisher took this to mean Story thought the state provision to be an
exercise of the police power, in contradiction to the broad interpretation of the commerce clause
outlined in of his own dissent in Mln. 5 C. SwIsHER, supra note 3, at 370.
189. License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847).
190. Two of the cases, concerning beverages imported from foreign countries, principally involved a statutory argument based on Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827): federal tariff acts authorized the importation and sale of the goods, and under the supremacy clause
the state could not take away what Congress had given. See License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) at
512-14 (Mr. Webster), 546 (Messrs. Ames and Whipple). Taney went out of his way to concede
that Brown had been rightly decided, and Daniel did likewise to dispute Taney's view, id at 57576, 612-16, but neither case involved a prosecution of the importer and nobody seemed willing to
extend Brown's peculiar holding beyond the importer himself.
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McLean and Grier' 9 ' took the easy line: earlier cases confirmed
that the commerce clause did not forbid states to protect health and
morals under their police powers. 92 This seemed to be the basis of
Marshall's decision in Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co.,1 93 of his
quarantine example in Gibbons, and of the nearly unanimous Miln de-

cision; the only Justices who gave reasons in support of the power to
exclude slaves in Groves v. Slaughter had conceded it. Yet in the License Cases only Woodbury joined McLean and Grier in basing his

vote on the police power, 194 and it was not the sole ground of his
opinion.'

95

Woodbury also argued that the sale of imported liquor did not fall
within the federal commerce power at all: the interstate transaction
ended once the liquor entered the state, and the state had exclusive

authority to regulate ensuing sales as a matter of local commerce.' 96
This seemed a rather extreme position; after McCulloch v. Maryland 97

it could easily have been argued that some federal control over the sale
of imported goods was necessary and proper to prevent the effective

obstruction of commerce itself.
Most interesting and important was the argument of at least four
Justices that Congress' power over commerce was not exclusive. As
Taney and Catron convincingly explained,

98

the Court had never held

it was; in contrast to the power to coin money, the Constitution did not
say it was, and the Court had held that Congress' comparable powers
There was some discussion in the third case of whether the prohibition on state import taxes,
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, applied to interstate shipments. Se, e.g., License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.)
at 595 (McLean, J.) (denying application despite contrary dictum in Brown). As Catron said,
however, the license requirement was not even clearly a tax, for it imposed only a nominal fee to
cover administrative costs. Id at 599. In the cases involving foreign liquor the imports clause
argument met the same fate as that based on the tariffact: after leaving the hands of the importer,
the liquor was no longer an import. See, e.g., id at 577 (Taney, C.J.).
191. Grier had replaced Baldwin in 1846. See supra note 2.
192. License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) at 595, 631-32. Chief Justice Shaw had taken this position in upholding the Massachusetts law. Commonwealth v. Kimball, 41 Mass. (24 Pick.) 359
(1837).
193. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829); see supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
194. License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) at 627-32.
195. Indeed, he appeared to have doubts that the police power could be used to interfere with
interstate commerce itself, although that was what both Groves and the quarantine case seemed to
mean. Id at 630.
196. Id at 625. Daniel echoed this point. See id at 614-16. Compare this position with the
arguments of Taney and McLean in Groves. See supra notes 177-80, 182 and accompanying text.
197. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819); see Currie, States and Congress, 1801-1835, supra note 1,
at 927-38.
198. License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) at 578-86 (Taney, CJ.), 601-08 (Catron, J.).
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over bankruptcy and the militia were not. 199 Furthermore, quarantine
and pilotage laws showed that states had regulated commerce with congressional blessing ever since 1789, and not because they fell within the
"police power"; if federal authority were exclusive, it would be irrelevant whether a state's motive was "to guard the citizens of the State
from pestilence and disease" or to promote "the interests and convenience of trade." 20 °
20
As usual, Taney's opinion was competent and straightforward. '
202
Woodbury and Nelson, as well as Catron, agreed with him, and an
20 3
aside in Daniers opinion also seems to suggest the same conclusion.
Only McLean, gratuitously repeating his Groves argument, disagreed. 2°4 Grier properly avoided the subject,205 McKinley was absent, and Wayne apparently did not vote. 206 Thus four of the seven
Justices who voted declared flaty and persuasively 2 7 that the commerce clause did not limit state power. It seems unfortunate that
Daniel did not express more definitively the similar sentiments he was
to utter two years later in a dissent to the PassengerCases.20 8 Although
199. See Currie, FederalCourts, 1801-1835, supra note 1,at 702-05 (discussing Houston v.
Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1 (1820)); Currie,Statesand Congress,1801-1835,supra note 1,at 91016 (discussing Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819)). Taney persuasively ex-

plained that the arguably contrary naturalization decision of Chirac v. Lessee of Chirac, 15 U.S. (2.
Wheat.) 259 (1817), was based upon a conflict with federal law. License Cases,46 U.S. (5 How.) at585.
200. License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) at 583. Taney's fiat denial that the laws requiring use of
local pilots could be characterized as police power measures, id, was unexplained and unconvincing; those laws seemed clearly designed to promote safety.
201. See the admiring discussions in T. PowEL., VAGARIES AND VARIETIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 148-51 (1956), and in F. FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
UNDER MARSHAI.L, TANEY AND WAITE 51-53 (1937).
202. License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) at 618, 624. Nelson had replaced Thompson in 1845.
See supra note 2.
203. Daniel said state laws affecting commerce were void only if "essentially and directly in
conflict with some power clearly invested in Congress by the constitution; and, I would add, with
some regulation actually established by Congress in virtue of that power." License Cases, 46 U.S.
(5 How.) at 615.
204. Id at 595.
205. Id at 631-32.
206. See 5 C. SWISHER,Msupra note 3, at 372 ("[Under pressure from Circuit Court litigants,"
McKinley "had notified. . . Taney that he was going to New Orleans for circuit work instead of
coming to Washington."). Wayne, however, was present at least during the argument, for he
inteIjected remarks from the bench. License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) at 545. Professor Swisher
claims, without citation, that Wayne agreed the laws were constitutional. 5 C. SWISHER, supra
note 3, at 373.
207. See Currie, States and Congres, 1801-1835, supra note I, at 946 n.406.
208. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 494 (1849) (Daniel, J.,
dissenting); see infra notes 225-26 and accompanying text; see also J.FRANK, supra note 10, at 191 ("for a fleeting and confused moment
... the law... was that the commerce clause was not exclusive--and Daniel's position was the
most extreme of all.").
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the Court in Taney's own time would demonstrate that constitutional
precedents enjoyed no immunity from being overruled, 20 9 the License
Cases were hardly a precedent at all.
C.

Passenger Cases.
New York and Massachusetts charged ship captains a fee for every

passenger they brought into the state. By a five to four vote in 1849 the

10
Court held these levies invalid. 2
Only two years had passed since laws limiting the sale of imported
liquor had been upheld in the License Cases,2 1t and the Court's person-

nel had not changed. Once again no one spoke for the Court; eight
Justices felt called upon to write extensive opinions. As in Groves and
the License Cases, McLean argued that only Congress could regulate
commerce, 2 12 and this time Wayne and McKinley agreed. 2 13 Wayne
asserted that all five members of the majority joined in this conclu-

sion, 214 but there is room for doubt. Neither Grier 215 nor Catron 2 16
discussed the commerce clause; Catron, who had argued at some length
in the License Cases against an exclusive federal commerce power, 21 7
merely said in the PassengerCases that the issue was not presented. 21 8
209. See Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court Article IV andFederal Power, 18361864, 1983 DuKE LJ.696 (discussing admiralty and diversity cases). See also Daniel's view in the
License Cases themselves, 46 U.S. (5 How.) at 611-12, that constitutional precedents were never
binding, as well as the views of Justice Johnson, noted in Currie, FederalCourts, 1801-1835, supra
note 1, at 700-01.
210. Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849). For the context of the cases, see 5 C.
SWISHER, SUpra note 3, at 382-93; 2 C. WARREN,supra note 10, at 168-82.
211. 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847).
212. Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 393-400. In the course of this discussion McLean
quoted, to no particular avail, from Madison's recently published notes of the Constitutional Convention. This may have been the first time the Court cited the notes. See id at 396.
213. Id at 410-11, 452. Protesting that "a majority" of those voting to strike down the laws
"do not think it necessary ... to reaffirm" the exclusivity of federal power, Wayne went right on
to reaffirm that it had been established in Gibbons and was the "foundation" of his conclusion. Id
at 411. McKinley both endorsed McLean's opinion, see id at 452, and restated its holding of
exclusive power, id at 454.
214. Id at 410-15; see also L TmBE,AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-4, at 324 n.2
(1978) (questionably describing the Passenger Cases as "the first to hold a state's action violative
of the commerce clause in the absence of a relevant federal statute").
215. Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 455-64.
216. Id at 437-52.
217. See supra text accompanying notes 198-200.
218. PassengerCases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 446. Grier did join Catron's opinion, id at 452, and
in a separate paragraph McKinley announced mysteriously that Catron joined his opinion (which
did argue exclusivity) "so far as Mr. Justice McKinley's individual views are expressed, when
taken in connection with Mr. Justice Catron's opinion," id at 455. It is difficult to believe that by
this oddly qualified endorsement of McKinley's views Catron meant to announce without expla-
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Separate dissents by Taney, Daniel, and Woodbury 2 9 offered
three strong responses and one weak one to the exclusivity argument,
and as in the License Cases Nelson mercifully joined Taney without
explanation. 22° First, Min and other cases had recognized that the
states retained their police powers whether or not the commerce power
itself was exclusive; because the passenger fees funded the treatment of
diseased passengers and the support of indigent aliens, they served the

acknowledged police purposes of avoiding the burden of supporting
paupers and the introduction of disease. 22 McLean's response that
these were revenue rather than police measures 222 recalls Story's losing
contention in Miln that a state could not enforce its health laws by
regulating commerce; 223 all the other Justices, including McLean, had

concluded in Miln that purpose rather than form controlled. Second,
the dissenters argued, if form was indeed the test, the passenger fees
were taxes, not regulations, and Marshall had clearly stated in Gibbons
that the states retained not only the police power but the tax power as
well.
The third argument, joined this time by Daniel, was that the
commerce power itself was not exclusive;2 -5 five of the nine Justices
nation that he had completely reversed the position he had taken in the License Cases only two
years before.
219. Id at 464 (Taney, CJ.), 494 (Daniel, J.), 518 (Woodbury, J.). Taney emphasized, id at
492, that the passengers involved in the case had come from abroad, adding in anticipation of
Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 WaIL) 35 (1868), that American citizens had a right to travel from
one state to another derived by inference from a variety of constitutional provisions.
220. Passenger Case.s, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 518; see also supra text accompanying note 202.
221. PassengerCases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 465-70,483-90 (raney), 518-24,546 (Woodbury); cf
New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837) (paupers); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1
(1824) (quarantine) (both discussedsupra at text accompanying notes 11-36). Chief Justice Shaw
had adopted this police power ground in upholding the Massachusetts law at the state level Norris v. City of Boston, 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 282 (1842).
222. Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 403-04.
223. See supra text accompanying notes 27-29.
224. See Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 479-80 (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 1, 201-02 (1824), where Marshall had rejected the contention that the import-export
clause implied a state power otherwise to regulate commerce ("This prohibition.., is an exception from the acknowledged power of the States to levy taxes, not from the questionable power ta
regulate commerce.")); see aso PassengerCases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 545-49 (Woodbury, J.). McLean addressed this problem by vaguely invoking the unsatisfring argument of McCulloch v.
Maryland that the power to tax was the power to forbid, which Marshall himself had rejected in
contract clause cases, see supra text accompanying notes 63-64, 72-74 (discussing Providence Bank
v. Billings, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 514 (1830)) as well as in the passage just quoted from Gibbons. Passen-:
ger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 404 (McLean, J.).
225. PassengerCases, 48 U.S. 7 How.) at 470-71 (Taney, CJ.), 497-500 (Daniel, J.), 545,55461 (Woodbury, J.).
Woodbury equivocated somewhat as to "matters of exterior, general, and
uniform cognizance," id at 559, anticipating the distinction later drawn by the Court in the Cooley case. See infra notes 249-56 and accompanying text. He considered the taxes in question to.
fall'into the category of "details and local matters," where he found no exclusivity. Passenger
Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 558-59.
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were now firmly on record against exclusivity, but unfortunately not all
226
in the same case.

The dissenters' final argument that the transportation of passengers fell entirely outside the commerce clause 227 contradicted the holding of Gibbons. It also demonstrated the inconsistency of McLean, who
had said in Groves that Mississippi could exclude slaves because people
were not articles of commerce,2 8 and it served Marshall right for not
clearly stating, when he had sustained federal power to license steamboats, that the vessels in question carried only passengers. 229
Catron and Grier, the two members of the majority who did not
invoke the commerce clause, found at least four other grounds for
striking down the passenger taxes, and each joined the other's opinion. 230 Catron argued that the state laws conflicted both with federal

statutes and with treaties: by exempting personal baggage from import
duties Congress had effectively given its owners a right to enter for
nothing, and a treaty explicitly guaranteed British subjects free entry.23 1 As Daniel noted on behalf of the dissenters, the exemption

seemed to prove only that Congress had decided to lay no federal tax
on baggage, and both of Catron's arguments seemed to contradict the
state's admitted power to exclude the indigent or diseased. 232 Nevertheless, Justice Wayne seems correct that every Justice in the majority
226. Despite the contention of Taney and Daniel that five Justices had voted against exclusivity in the License Cases, see PassengerCases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 470, 497, Daniel's adherence to
that position in the earlier case had been equivocal at best. See supra notes 203, 208 and accompanying text. Similarly, Catron not only failed to repeat his anti-exclusivity argument in the Passenger Cases; he arguably repudiated it by endorsing McKinley's opinion taking the opposite view.
See supra note 218.
227. Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 493-94 (Taney, CJ.), 509-11 (Daniel, J.), 541-44
(Woodbury, J.).
228. See supra text accompanying notes 178-79. McLean had acknowledged in Groves that
the navigation of ships transporting passengers was a commercial activity. See Groves, 40 U.S. (15
Pet.) at 505-06. He never explained how that squared with his conclusion that people were not
articles of commerce.
229. The question whether commerce included passenger service provoked a long exchange
between Wayne and Taney over the genesis of a stray remark in Miln that seemed to say it did
not. See PassengerCases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 428-36, 487-90 (referring to Mi/n, 36 U.S. (II Pet.)
at 136). Because Miln had focused on the police power, and neither Wayne nor Taney suggested
Gibbons had been overruled, the substantive controversy seems to have been blown out of all
proportion.
230. PassengerCases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 452, 464.
231. Id at 439-44.
232. Id at 508-09. Catron's conclusion followed easily from Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12
Wheat.) 419 (1827), where the court had overridden cogent objections similar to those of the
PassengerCases dissenters in holding that an importer had purchased immunity from state taxes
by paying federal customs duties. See Currie, States and Congress, 1801-1835, sup?a note 1, at
948-53.

Vol 1983.4711

THE SUPREME COURT." 1836-1864

agreed that the statute and treaty superseded state power, 233 it was
quite superfluous for three of them to add that the commerce clause did
too.
More inventive and less contrived than any of the foregoing objections was Justice Grier's position that the passenger fees were in effect
tonnage and import duties forbidden by article I, section l.234 In form
the tax lay neither on the vessel nor on imported goods, and, as the
dissenters pointed out, the term "imports" could hardly apply to passengers arriving of their own free will.235 Griefs point, however, was

that the state could not tax either the ship or the passengers' baggage by
indirection: making the captain pay for each passenger was just another way of scaling his liability to the size of the ship. This seems to
have been the majority's best argument, but the dissenters did not dignify it with a reply.236
Not content to have enunciated five. distinct grounds for their conclusion, the majority Justices embellished their opinions with four
others that were so transparently flimsy that I have relegated them to a
footnote.237 The upshot was almost total incoherence. Unlike its predecessors, the Taney Court certainly could not be accused of deciding
major constitutional cases without writing sufficiently lengthy opinions.
Rather, it buried the unhappy reader in a torrent of verbiage: the Justices had written over one hundred pages of opinions in the License
Cases and nearly two hundred in the PassengerCases without providing any meaningful guidance for future controversies. 238
233. Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 406, 408 (McLean, J.), 411-13 (Wayne, J.), 439-44
(Catron, J.), 452 (Grier & McKinley, JJ.). ,
234. Id at 458-59, see also id at 412 (Wayne, J.), 445-46, 452 (Catron and McKinley, JJ.).
235. Id at 477-78 (Taney, CJ.), 535 (Woodbury, J.). The dissenters could have strengthened

this point by reference to the distinction between "Importation" and "Migration" of persons in the
slave-trade clause of article 1,§ 9, but they had to deny that "Migration" in this clause applied to
free persons, lest it imply that passenger traffic was commerce. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9; see, e.g.
Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 474-76 (Taney, CJ.), 511-14 (Daniel, J.). For the contrary
view, see id at 452-54 (McKinley, J.).
236. Taney gave only his conclusion that the tonnage clause did not apply. PassengerCases,
48 U.S. (7 How.) at 473. The other dissenters said nothing at all.
237. See id at 405 (McLean, J.), 419-21 (Wayne, J.)(suggesting that the states had offended
the provisions of article I, §§ 8 and 9, requiring uniform duties and forbidding preferences for the
ports of one state over those of another). As the Court would later confirm in the case of port
preferences (Morgan v. Louisiana, 118 U.S. 455, 467 (1886)), the context indicates both constitutional provisions limited only federal authority. See also PassengerCases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 426
(Wayne, J.)
(arguing that taxing immigration offended the naturalization clause because it might
interfere with federal policy); Id at 447 (Catron, 3.) (arguing that if the states do what Congress
has power to do they are subject to the limitations applicable to Congress and thus cannot tax for
purely local purposes).
238. For similar criticism, see also 2 C. WARREN, supra note 10, at 179.
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Cooley v. Board of Wardens.
Help was badly needed, and it was not long in coming. Gathered

to his ancestors after only six years of service, Justice Woodbury was
replaced by Benjamin R. Curtis of Massachusetts, 239 the only Whig
ever to ascend to the supreme bench and very likely the only sorcerer.

Within a few months of his appointment Curtis would conjure up out
interof the morass a solid majority for a brand new commerce clause
240
pretation that would dominate decisions for nearly a century.
The occasion was an action by the wardens of the port of Philadel-

phia to recover half the prescribed pilotage fee as a penalty for the
departure of two ships without local pilots. The central argument was
that the state law offended the commerce clause, but the Court held
that it did not. Wayne and McLean dissented, McKinley was absent,

and Daniel wrote a separate concurrence; 241 but Curtis, refreshingly,
242
wrote an opinion for the Court.

The result was predictable. Congress had provided in 1789 that

state pilotage laws should govern, 243 and in decisions from Gibbons to
the Passenger Cases Justices of all persuasions had branded them
valid. 244 As safety measures 24 5 they seemed, as Daniel's concurrence
argued,2 6 classic exercises of the police power 247 and therefore easy to
239. See supra note 2.
240. The next major reformulation would come in Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S.
761 (1945), and even then the Court paid obeisance to Curtis's test. See L. TRtnEsupra note 214,
§ 6-4, at 324 (Cooley "laid the groundwork for all that has come since.").
241. Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 321, 325 (1852); see 5 C. SWISHER,
supra note 3, at 405 ("Justice McKinley being absent because of the illness that was soon to
terminate in death").
242. Cooley, 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 311.
243. Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 9, § 4, 1 Stat. 53, 54.
244. See, eg., Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 401-02 (McLean, J.), 497 (Daniel, 3.)
(1849); Gibbons.v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 207-08 (1824) (Marshall, CJ.).
245. See Cooley, 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 312 (Curtis, J.) ("they rest upon the propriety of securing lives and property exposed to the perils of a dangerous navigation, by taking on board a
person peculiarly skilled to encounter or avoid them").
246. Daniel also argued-unnecessarily and unconvincingly, cf. United States v. Coombs, 37
U.S. (12 Pet.) 72 (1838) (Congress may punish theft of shipwrecked goods) (noted infra note 273
and accompanying text)--that the safety of interstate shipping was beyond congressional control.
Cooley, 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 325-26.
247. Marshall had equivocated; see Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 208:
The acknowledged power of a State to regulate its police, its domestic trade, and to
govern its own citizens, may enable it to legislate on this subject, to a considerable extent;
and the adoption ofits system by Congress, and the application of it to the whole subject
of commerce, does not seem to the Court to imply a right in the States so to apply it of
their own authority.
The offenders' counsel argued in Cooley that the fee supported "decayed" or "superannuated"
pilots, making it not a police regulation but a tax analogous to that in the PassengerCases. Cooley, 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 302, 308 (Messrs. Morris and Tyson). But the fees were assessed only on
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sustain on the basis of precedent. 248
Curtis's reasoning, however, was a bolt out of the blue. Ignoring
Marshall's treatment of the analogous quarantine laws, Curtis frankly
acknowledged that the pilotage law was a regulation of commerce: the
Court had already held navigation was commerce, 249 and the pilots' job
was navigation.250 By calling the pilotage law a commercial regulation,
Curtis appeared either to reject Marshall's metaphysical police power
distinction altogether or to resuscitate Story's repudiated view that
form rather than purpose was controlling;25 ' yet he acknowledged
neither that his approach was new nor that the police power had ever
played a part in the Court's decisions. 252 Indeed, in best Marshall fashion, Curtis barely acknowledged that there had been any earlier decisions. Correctly observing that prior cases had not decided whether the
federal commerce power was exclusive,25 3 Curtis cited none of them
and treated the question as one of first impression:
those who disobeyed the law, see id at 311-12, thus clearly promoting safety by encouraging
compliance; and surely the police power included, as in Milm and the License Cases, the authority
to punish offenders.
. 248. The holding that the measure was not a tax, Cooley, 53 U.S. (12 How.) at
313, provided a
basis for the similarly correct holding that the fee did not violate the prohibition of article I, § 10
on state tonnage or export duties, the requirement of article I, § 8, that federal taxes be uniform, or
the provision of article I, § 9 that ships going to one state not be required to pay duties in another.
Id at 313-14. Curtis rightly added that the fee requirement created "an objection" to Philadelphia rather than a preference forbidden by article I, § 9. See Cooley, 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 313-15.
The Court could also have pointed out that the last three of these provisions applied only to
federal measures. q. Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833) (discussed in
Currie, Stlates and Congress, 1801-1835, supra note 1, at 964-69). Their invocation had been encouraged by the unrestrained opinions of Wayne and Catron in the PassengerCases.
249. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 193 (Curtis did not restate this holding); see Currie, States
and Congress, 1801-1835, supra note I, at 938-47.
250. Cooley, 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 315-16.
251. New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102, 153-61 (1837) (dissenting opinion).
252. None of Curtis's colleagues noted this apparent change of direction either. Both Grier
and McLean had based their concurrence in the License Cases on the police power, see supra text
accompanying notes 191-92; yet the former remained silent in Cooley, and McLean surprisingly
dissented on the ground that the commerce power was exclusive, without mentioning the police
power at alL See Cooley, 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 321-25. Wayne, who had joined the police power
opinion in Min, see supra note 18, dissented without opinion.
253. The Marshall Court's decisions on the commerce clause were inconclusive, see Currie,
Statesand Congress,1801-1835, supra note 1,at 94247, 951-52, 969; Mi/n expressly left the issue
open; Groves reflected no consensus as to the reason for its dictum that states could exclude slaves;
the positions of Daniel in the L ese Cases and of Catron and Grier in the PassengerCases were
obscure enough to prevent any confident statement that a majority of the whole Court held in the
former that states could regulate commerce or in the latter that they could not. See supra text
accompanying notes 20-33, 17788, 203-08, 215-18, 230-36. Surprisingly, Curtis's statement provoked no challenge by any of the three Justices (Wayne, Taney, and Daniel) who had stoutly
maintained in the Passenger Cases only three years before that the issue was already settled. See
supra notes 214, 226 and accompanying text.
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Now the power to regulate commerce, embraces a vast field, containing not only many, but exceedingly various subjects, quite unlike in
their nature; some imperatively demanding a single uniform rule, operating equally on the commerce of the United States in every port;
and some, like the subject now in question, as imperatively demanding that diversity, which alone can meet the local necessities of
navigation.
.. . Whatever subjects of this power are in their nature national, or admit only of one uniform system, or plan of regulation,
may justly be said to be of such a nature as to require exclusive legislation by Congress. That this cannot be affirmed of laws for the regulation of pilots and pilotage is plain. The act of 1789 contains a
clear and authoritative declaration by the first Congress, that the nature of this subject is such, that until Congress should find it necessary to exert its power, it should be left to the legislation of the States;
that it is local and not national; that it is likely to be the best provided for, not by one system, or plan of regulations, but by as many
as the legislative discretion of the several States should deem 2applica54
ble to the local peculiarities of the ports within their limits.
This was a revolution. Curtis's interpretation was contrary to that
formally embraced in previous cases by every one of his brethren except Grier,255 yet three of these Justices acquiesced without a murmur.2 5 6 Of course the result in Cooley did not conflict with the theory
of fully concurrent authority that these three had earlier announced,
and scholars have speculated that they joined the opinion either out of
a lack of interest in Curtis's "incidental remarks"' ' 7 or "as a barrier to
the adoption of a more rigid formula."' 'z 8 The impression remains,
however, of a statesmanlike compromise designed to bring order out of
chaos, and of most remarkable leadership by a Justice who had barely
had time to slip into his robe.
Whether Curtis's interpretation was convincing is another story.
The words of the clause cut against him: the simple grant of authority
to regulate commerce might or might not imply exclusivity, but it cer254. Cooley, 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 319.
255. The only evidence of a similar view to be found in earlier opinions was a stray remark by
Woodbury in the PassengerCases. See supra note 225; see also J. FRANK, supra note 10, at 196-97
(tracing Curtis's conclusion to the argument of "his mentor Webster" in Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) at 14:
the words used in the constitution ... are so very general and extensive, that they might
be construed to cover a vast field of legislation, part of which has always been occupied

by State laws; and, therefore .... the power should be considered as exclusively vested
in congress, so far, and so far only, as the nature of the power requires).
256. Taney, Catron, and Nelson silently joined Curtis's opinion. The formerly uncommitted
Grier was the fifth Justice to join the opinion.
257. 5 C. SWISHER, supra note 3, at 406.
258. F. FRANKFURTER, supra note 201, at 56-58.
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tainly seemed to treat the subject as unitary.259 Moreover, though the

degree of need for uniformity was obviously relevant to the Framers'
ostensible purpose of preventing undue obstructions to commerce, 260
the clause appeared to empower Congress rather than the Court to
make the determination. Indeed, Curtis made no effort to reconcile his
conclusion with either the text or the purpose of article I. Instead, borrowing another page from Marshall, he simply took it for granted that
the Framers had done the right thing. Marshall had said the Court
could ignore unconstitutional legislation and review state court judgments because reasonable Framers would have so provided; 261 Curtis
said the commerce power was exclusive only when it ought to be.
Curtis also failed to explain how the Court was supposed to determine whether or not a need for uniformity existed, 262 and his application of the new criterion to the case before him left something to be
desired. The "local peculiarities" of various ports seemed to require
only local pilots, not a plethora of different rules to confuse the traveler. 263 Curtis's only other argument was that Congress had thought
diversity preferable, and he had already gone out of his way to argue
that Congress' approval of state laws was not decisive:
If the law of Pennsylvania, now in question, had been in existence at
the date of this act of Congress, we might hold it to have been
adopted by Congress, and thus made a law of the United States, and
so valid.[2641 . . .
But the law on which these actions are founded was not enacted
till 1803....
259. In this respect Marshall's police power distinction was more satisfactory; there was a
certain linguistic persuasiveness in arguing that the only power denied the states was that given to

Congress.
260. See, eg., THE FEDERALIST No. 22 (A. Hamilton).
261. See Currie,FederalCourts, 1801-1835, supra note 1, at 651-61, 687-94 (discussing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), and Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264

(1821)).
262. See R. NEWMYEt, supra note 36, at 107 ("the significant feature of the decision was not
the formulation of a definitive doctrine but the court's tacit agreement to stop looking for one").
For a discussion of the ambiguity of the test, see T. PoWEL, supra note 201, at 153-55.
263. Fifty years after Cooley, in holding that the admiralty clause of article III deprived a state
ofpower to make a foreign vessel liable for supplies furnished to an independent contractor, the
Court would stress the inability of the master "to acquaint himself with the laws of each individual State he may visit." The Roanoke, 189 U.S. 185, 195 (1903). For discussion of the negative
effect of the admiralty clause on state laws, see Currie, FederalismandtheAdmiralty: "The Devil's
Own fess," 1960 Sup. CT. REv. 158.
264. Cf Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 21, 1 Stat. 93; Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275, 276
(adopting state procedures in force in 1789 to govern federal court proceedings); Wayman v.
Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825) (discussed in Currie, FederalCourts, 1801-1835, supra note
1, at 713-16).
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If the Constitution excluded the states from making any law regulating commerce, certainly Congress cannot
re-grant, or in any
265
manner re-convey to the states that power.
Whether the commerce clause flatly "excluded the states from
making any law" on the subject was, however, the very question in
issue. That the clause might have an implicit restraining effect on the
states did not compel the conclusion that the restraint was as absolute
as the explicit bar on coining money. 266 The language of the clause
made more persuasive an analogy to the clauses forbidding state imposts, wars, and compacts "without the Consent of [the] Congress" 267:
even if the Court must guard the federal interest in uniformity in the
numerous cases Congiess might have difficulty anticipating, the Framers still seem to have vested ultimate trust in Congress to determine the
extent of free commerce. 268 In other words, a decision to allow state
regulation of commerce may itself be a regulation of commerce, and
269
the contrary view taken in Cooley has not survived.
Taken by itself, Cooley may appear arbitrary, conclusory, and irreconcilable with the constitutional text. Nevertheless, anyone who has
slogged through the Augean agglomeration preceding Curtis's labors
must find them scarcely less impressive than those of the old stablecleaner himself.
E. Epilogue.
In doctrinal terms Cooley began a new era, but practically speaking it concluded the Taney Court's pronouncements on the negative
effect of the commerce clause. The Court decided a number of additional cases with commerce clause overtones during Taney's twelve remaining years, but not one of them squarely faced the question
whether Congress' power was exclusive, and not one so much as cited
Cooley.
Several of the decisions upholding state authority rested at least in
part on the reasonable conclusion that the activity in question was not
"commerce" at all. A tax on negotiable instruments or other property
was not one on commerce even though the articles might later be sent
265. Cooley, 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 317-18.
266. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. Indeed Curtis had already held it was not, for he said federal
power was exclusive only when uniformity was required.
267. U.S. CONST. art. L § 10; see T. PowELL, supra note 201, at 161.
268. "The Congress shall have power... [t]o regulate commerce . . . among the several
States ....
" U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (emphasis added).
269. See, ag., Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946).
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outside the state;270 navigation of a landlocked body of water was
neither interstate nor foreign commerce. 27 ' On the other hand, the
Court held that Congress could regulate a vessel that helped land interstate cargoes even though it never left Mobile harbor 272 and could
punish those who stole shipwrecked goods. 273 From the conclusion
that Congress could protect commerce from thieves not themselves operating interstate it seems only a small step to the notorious 1914
Shreveport decision allowing federal regulation of local rates that drew
business away from interstate railroads; 274 on balance, the Taney Court
275
did not take a narrow view of Congress's commerce power.
Moreover, despite its refusal to discuss the preclusive effect of the
commerce clause after Cooley,276 the Court was not reluctant to find
other ways of protecting commerce against state interference. In ordering removal of the obstructive Wheeling Bridge, for example, 277 the
Court aggressively extended Marshall's interpretation of a federal
coasting license 278 and invoked an interstate compact provision whose
270. Nathan v. Louisiana, 49 U.S. (8How.) 73, 80-81 (1850) (McLean, J.); cf.Mager v. Grima,
49 U.S. (8 How.) 490 (1850) (Taney, CJ.) (allowing taxation of a legacy left to an alien).
271. Veazie v. Moor, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 568, 573-75 (1853) (Daniel, J.).
272. Foster v. Davenport, 63 U.S. (22 How.) 244, 246 (1859) (Nelson, J.) ("The lightering or
towing was but the prolongation of the voyage of the vessels assisted to their port of destination.").
273. United States v. Coombs, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 72, 78 (1838) (Story, J.) (the power to regulate
commerce "extends to such acts, done on land, which interfere with, obstruct, or prevent the due
exercise of the powcr to regulate commerce and navigation").
274. Houston E. & W. Texas Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914).
275. Seealso United States v. Marigold, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 560,566-67 (1850) (resolving an old
controversy by unanimously holding that Congress might prohibit the importation of counterfeit
money: "it can scarcely, at this day, be open to doubt, that every subject falling within the legitimate sphere of commercial regulation may be partially or wholly excluded, when either measure
shall be demanded by the safety or by the important interests of the entire nation"). Justice
Daniel, the most extreme states'-righter on the Court, wrote this opinion.
276. See, ag., Cushing v. Owners of Ship John Fraser, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 184, 187-88 (1858)
(Taney, CJ.) (allowing state to restrict the time and place of anchorage and require lights on
anchored ships because laws contained "nothing ...in conflict with any law of Congress regulating commerce, or with the general admiralty jurisdiction conferred on the courts of the United
States").
277. Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518, 578 (1852)
(over dissents by Taney and Daniel). See generally 5 C. SWISHER, supra note 3, at
(McLean, J.)
408-18. Because this holding was entirely statutory, a second decision allowing Congress to permii the obstruction, Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421
(1856) (Nelson, J.), remained true to Cooley's conclusion that Congress could not give the states
powers denied them by the Constitution.
278. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824); see Currie, States and Congress, 18011835,supra note 1,at 938-47; see also Sinnot v. Davenport, 63 U.S. (22 How.) 227, 240-44 (1859)
(Nelson, J.) (holding a similar license forbade application of a state law requiring registration of
shipowners). At the end of his opinion in Sinnot Nelson conceded that quarantine laws had been
upheld except when "in conflict... with the act of Congress." Id at 244. He made no effort to
"how why the registration law conflicted with the license if a quarantine did not. Later decisions,
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applicability was debatable. 279 A tax on gold shipped from California
to New York was struck down on the basis of article I, section 10280
without discussion of the crucial question whether the ban on export
taxes in that section applied to interstate as well as to foreign shipments.28' And in Hays v. PacFcMail Steamshiv Co. 282 the Court invalidated a California property tax on out-of-state vessels without even
283
identifying the provision on which it relied.
In sum, Cooley's dictum finally established that the commerce
clause sometimes limited state power. When Taney died in 1864, howhowever, upheld the application to federally licensed ships of state laws regulating oystering tools
and granting a monopoly of interstate ferry service. See, e.g., Conway v. Taylor's Executor, 66
U.S. (1 Black) 603, 633-35 (1862) (Swayne, J.); Smith v. Maryland, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 71, 74-76
(1855) (Curtis, J.). In the latter case the Court explained only that the state owned the seabed and
was attempting evenhandedly to conserve its resources; in the former, only that a Gibbons dictum
and long practice had confirmed state power over ferries. See Conway, 66 U.S. (I Black) at 63335; Smith, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 74-75.
279. Taney argued in dissent that such compacts have "always been construed to mean nothing more than the river shall be as free to the citizens or subjects for which the other party contracts, as it is to the citizens or subjects of the State in which it is situated." Wheeling & Belmont
Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) at 583. Taney also argued that Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh
Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.).245 (1829), had shown the license gave only "the right to navigate the public
waters wherever they find them navigable." Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) at
586. McLean, speaking for the Court, seemed to think Willson allowed the state to obstruct only
small streams. Id at 566.
280. "No State shall... lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports, except what may be
...U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 10, cl.2.
absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws.
281. Almy v. California, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 169 (1861) (Taney, C.J.). Marshall had said that
the ban applied to interstate shipments in dictum in Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419,
449 (1827) ("[W]e suppose the principles laid down in this case, to apply equally to importations
from a sister State."), seegenerally Currie,States and Congress,1801-1835,supra note 1,at 948-53,
and though McLean had disagreed in the Passenger Cases, see 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 407 (McLean,
J.), he remained silent in Almy. The Court destroyed this basis for Almy's holding shortly after
Taney left the bench. See Woodruff v. Parham, 75 U.S. (8 WalL) 123 (1869).
282. 58 U.S. (17 How.) 596 (1855).
283. Federal statutes, Nelson said, required registration of the vessels in their home port of
New York. Id at 598. The ships engaged in commerce between the states. They entered harbors
and discharged cargoes "independently of any control over them, except as it respects such municipal and sanitary regulations of the local authorities as are not inconsistent with the constitution

and laws of the general government, to which belongs the regulation of commerce with foreign
nations and between the States." Id at 599. If California could tax these ships, he claimed, so

could every other state they touched. Finally, "the admiralty law" recognized many distinctions
between local and foreign vessels, and
California had no jurisdiction over these vessels for the purpose of taxation; they were
not, properly, abiding within its limits, so as to become incorporated with the other personal property of the State; they were there but temporarily, engaged in lawful trade and
commerce with their sita at the home port, where the vessels belonged, and where the
owners were liable to be taxed for the capital invested, and where the taxes had been
paid.
Id at 599-600. Daniel's dissent relied on an unexplained lack of jurisdiction to hear the case. Id
at 600.
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ever, no one could yet say confidently that the Court had ever found an
instance in which it did.
CONCLUSION

The three 1837 decisions upholding state authority created a false
impression. Later decisions revealed that the Court under Taney was
prepared to act vigorously to protect both contracts and commerce
from state interference, and that in Taney, Story, Curtis, and Thompson the period had its share of strong Justices. Both these strengths and
the Court's general affinity for Marshall's nationalistic views were confirmed, moreover, by decisions in other areas. Those decisions will be
considered in the next issue of the Duke Law Journal.

